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Abstract
There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM in capital
budgeting – as recommended in textbooks – should thus have real effects. For instance, low beta
projects should be valued more by CAPM-users than by the market. We test this hypothesis
using M&A data and show that bids for low-beta private targets entail lower bidder returns.
We provide further support by testing several ancillary predictions. Our analyses suggest that
using the CAPM when valuing targets leads to valuation errors (relative to the market’s view)
corresponding on average to 12% to 33% of the deal values.
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1 Introduction
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) is the pre-
dominant model of risk and return taught by academics in universities and business schools in undergraduate,
MBA, and executive education programs. The CAPM is also widely used in practice, in particular, to esti-
mate firms’ cost of (equity) capital.1 However, it is well known that the CAPM does not fit the data. The
average realized returns of low beta securities are higher and those of high beta securities lower than the
CAPM predicts. In other words, the slope of the empirical security market line (SML) is less steep than
implied by the CAPM (e.g., Black, Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Fama and French, 2004; Baker, Bradley, and
Wurgler, 2011; Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014).
We show that the widespread use of the CAPM for cost of capital computations has real effects, in par-
ticular, for firms’ capital budgeting decisions and the market’s reaction thereto. The intuition is as follows.
For low beta investments, the cost of capital implied by the CAPM is lower than the cost of capital implied
by the empirical SML. Equivalently, the “CAPM-based valuation” of low beta investments exceeds their
market valuation. Consequently, managers who use the CAPM for capital budgeting are willing to under-
take low beta projects at prices that the market deems too high. The reverse holds for high beta projects. It
follows that the stock market reaction to low beta investments is less favorable than to high beta investments.
To test this prediction, we study mergers and acquisitions. This is a suitable setting because acquisitions
are examples of large-scale investments, and their known announcement dates allow us to observe the stock
market reaction. Further, because standard capital budgeting decisions involve projects that are not publicly
1Among the CFOs of public firms surveyed in Graham and Harvey (2001, p. 201), “the CAPM is by far the most popular method
of estimating the cost of equity capital: 73.5% of respondents always or almost always use the CAPM.” Jacobs and Shivdasani
(2012, p. 120) report that “about 90% of the respondents in a survey conducted by the Association for Financial Professionals use
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity.” In a survey among valuation professionals, Mukhlynina and
Nyborg (2016, p. 22) find that “76% of respondents use the CAPM almost always or always” to compute the cost of equity.
1
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traded, our main test focuses on bids for private targets. In particular, using data from SDC Platinum on
more than 12,000 takeover bids for private targets during the period from 1977 to 2015, we show that bids
for low beta targets entail more negative stock market reactions than bids for high beta targets. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to document this relation. Specifically, we find that a difference in target
betas of one interquartile range (0.49) is associated with a difference in bidder cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) of 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to 6% to 16% of the interquartile range of bidder
CARs. This relation is not explained by any of the CAR determinants that have been documented in the
prior literature and does not depend on the model we use to estimate betas or CARs.
Potential concerns are that our beta estimates may be noisy proxies for the actual beta estimates used by
managers in practice or that target betas may be correlated with unobserved determinants of bidder CARs.
For example, acquisitions of high beta targets may be associated with larger synergies. We mitigate such
concerns by estimating two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions. To do so, we rely on mutual fund fire
sales as a source of non-fundamental variation in realized stock returns (i.e., noise), which in turn translates
into non-fundamental variation in beta estimates (i.e., noise in the coefficient estimates from a regression
of excess stock on excess market returns). Using the scaled in-sample covariance between the estimated
noise components in realized excess stock returns and excess market returns as an instrument for the beta
estimates corroborates our results: We find a positive and statistically significant relation between target
betas and bidder CARs with a magnitude that is similar to the OLS estimates. We also show that high beta
targets have lower bid-implied valuations and receive lower offer premiums, that betas do not predict cash
flows, and that there is no relation between target betas and the combined CARs of bidders and targets. All
of these findings are at odds with the idea that acquisitions of high beta targets are associated with larger
synergies. Further, we show that the discount rates used in fairness opinions on the bids increase with the
targets’ beta, supporting the premise that the CAPM is used to estimate the cost of capital in practice.
We also test several cross-sectional predictions. The positive relation between target betas and bidder
2
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CARs is stronger if the targets’ growth rate and relative size are high. The intuition is that higher growth and
larger size amplify the difference between the CAPM-implied value of a target and the market’s assessment
thereof. The relation, instead, is weaker when the empirical SML has a steeper slope and thus diverges less
from the CAPM-implied SML. We also find that the relation is stronger for bidders that are more likely to
use the CAPM (as proxied by mentioning the CAPM in their SEC filings) and weaker if bidders are more
likely to rely on valuation multiples (as proxied by the availability of publicly listed peers of the target).
When examining bids for public firms, we find a significant relation between target betas and bidder CARs
only for low but not for high beta targets and an insignificant relation for public targets overall. A possible
explanation is that readily available market prices dampen the impact of using the CAPM, in particular for
targets with high betas (and thus low CAPM-implied valuations) because bids below current market prices
are unlikely to be successful. The sum of the cross-sectional patterns is important as it supports the idea that
the positive relation between target betas and bidder CARs is indeed due to bidders’ use of the CAPM. Any
alternative story must explain not only this main finding but also all of the cross-sectional results.
Our contribution is to show that using the CAPM has real effects: CAPM-users are willing to buy (sell)
low (high) beta assets at prices that the market deems too high (low). The resulting valuation discrepan-
cies are economically significant. In the M&A market for private targets, we estimate discrepancies that
correspond, on average, to 23% of the deal values (66 million in U.S. dollar terms, inflation adjusted to De-
cember 2015). This estimation is based on the calibration of a simple model in which corporate managers
use the CAPM whereas the market values targets based on the flatter empirical SML. The model turns out
to match the empirical relation between target betas and bidder CARs reasonably well and, given data on
actual takeovers, allows us to estimate the valuation discrepancy for each deal. The average discrepancy
implied by our regression results is in line with the model-implied estimates and ranges from 12% to 33%
of the deal values. Moreover, the insight that using the CAPM leads to a valuation error (relative to the
market’s view) is not specific to the M&A market but applies to capital budgeting decisions more generally.
3
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New investment projects are typically not publicly traded (as is the case for private targets), and the CAPM
is commonly used to compute the projects’ cost of capital. Our estimate of the valuation error in the M&A
context is thus likely to be a lower bound for the total error due to using the CAPM also in other contexts.
The normative implications of our study ultimately depend on how the debate about the veracity of
the CAPM is settled. One view is that the CAPM holds in the long-run, but that the market is inefficient.
According to this view, our findings reflect temporary mispricing by the market, and managers are right to
use the CAPM. An alternative view is that the market is efficient and the CAPM fails to explain expected
returns, even in the long run. According to that view, our findings reflect valuation mistakes by bidders
and sellers, and managers should not use the CAPM. It is difficult to empirically distinguish these alterna-
tives, but we provide some suggestive evidence that managers should not use the CAPM (at least not in its
simple, text-book form and in an M&A context). First, we do not find any return reversal in the long run,
suggesting long-lasting wealth effects for investors. Second, we find that the relation between target betas
and bidder CARs is weaker for bidders with stronger corporate governance (as proxied by the presence of
institutional investors and a higher wealth-perfomance-sensitivity of the bidder’s CEO) and for bidders with
less entrenched managers (as proxied by the number of anti-takeover provisions). These findings suggest
that managers’ reliance on the CAPM may not be in the interest of shareholders.
Regarding the existing literature, most closely related to our paper is the work of Baker, Hoeyer, and
Wurgler (2019), henceforth BHW, who start from the same observation as we do: The realized returns of
high beta stocks are lower than implied by the CAPM. BHW assume that managers are right to use the
CAPM and focus on the effect on financing decisions: They predict that leverage is a decreasing function of
beta. We instead focus on investment decisions. This distinction is important not only because financing and
investment are two different activities but also because whether and how using the CAPM affects financing
decisions is very different from the effect on investment decisions. As BHW point out, financing decisions
are affected only if there is a risk anomaly in the equity market but not in the debt market (or, at least, if
4
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
the risk anomaly in the debt market is weaker). The effect on investment decisions (and the corresponding
market reaction thereto) does instead not depend on market segmentation. In other words, the key condition
for BHW’s prediction that leverage is negatively related to asset risk is that equity and debt markets are
segmented, i.e., that risk is priced differently by equity investors compared to debt investors. In contrast, the
key condition for our prediction that bidder CARs are positively related to target asset betas is that risk is
priced differently by the market compared to corporate managers. Another difference is that we study not
only firms’ decisions (takeover bids) but also their effect on firm value (through bidder CARs). This is a
distinct advantage of the M&A setting: Takeovers constitute large investments with known announcement
dates, allowing us to quantify the value implications of managers’ use of the CAPM – at least, if one accepts
the premise that the stock market is efficient and bidder CARs reflective of value creation or destruction.
Our paper is also related to recent work on the real effects of the practice of capital budgeting. Kru¨ger,
Landier, and Thesmar (2015) assume that firms apply the beta of their core division even to investments with
different risks and hence expect targets to be undervalued by high beta bidders. We instead expect high beta
targets to be undervalued. These are two different mechanisms, but to make sure our findings are not driven
by bidders using their own cost of capital when valuing targets, we check that our results are unchanged when
controlling for the bidders’ beta. Jagannathan, Matsa, Meier, and Tarhan (2016) offer survey evidence that
high beta firms use higher discount rates than low beta firms, which supports the premise that firms use the
CAPM to compute discount rates. Levi and Welch (2017) recommend that betas be computed with a double
shrinkage, which would be consistent with an interpretation of our results whereby managers overestimate
the slope of the true SML. Finally, our paper is related to van Binsbergen and Opp (2019)’s recent study
on the impact of asset pricing anomalies on the real economy. They explore a wider set of anomalies than
we do but perform a very different exercise from ours: They make a model-based quantification of the real
impact of anomalies, while we attempt to trace out the impact of one anomaly on firm behavior in the data.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we develop our predictions. In Section 3, we describe the data. In
5
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Section 4, we present the results. In Section 5, we address alternative explanations. In Section 6, we discuss
possible interpretations (are CAPM-using managers rational or not?) and provide suggestive evidence. We
conclude in Section 7. The appendix contains definitions, derivations, extensions, and robustness tests.
2 Predictions
2.1 Target Betas and Bidder Abnormal Returns Around Bid Announcements
To provide a framework for our analysis, we now introduce a simple model that formalizes our arguments.
As a typical capital budgeting case is arguably an investment in a new project that is not publicly traded
and thus more similar to a bid for a private target, we restrict attention to private targets here and consider
the case of a public target in Appendix III. Acquisitions of private targets are also much more common,
accounting for almost 90% of all M&A transactions by U.S. bidders between 1977 and 2015 in the SDC
Platinum database (including transactions with undisclosed deal values but excluding share repurchases).
There are three players: (1) “the bidder,” a public firm that seeks to acquire a private target;2 (2) “the
seller,” the target’s current owners; and (3) “the market,” other investors in the market place. The bidder and
the seller value assets by discounting expected future cash flows at the cost of capital implied by the CAPM.
The market, instead, values assets in line with the empirical SML (by construction), which may differ from
the CAPM-implied SML.3 This is the only relevant difference between the market and the other two players.
2We consider an acquisition of less than 100% of the target’s equity in Appendix III.
3Our predictions are qualitatively unchanged if the bidder and seller use other methods (e.g., multiples) in addition to a DCF
valuation as long as they place at least some weight on the DCF-implied value. Note further that we do not make any assumption on
the valuation model used by the market except that the empirical SML that it generates may differ from the CAPM-implied SML.
6
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The value of the target’s equity conditional on an acquisition and as assessed by the bidder and seller is
Et = V
A
t + ∆t −Dt + St (1)
=
∞∑
τ=t+1
FCFτ
(1 + rA)
τ−t +
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ
(1 + r∆)
τ−t −
∞∑
τ=t+1
dτ
(1 + rD)
τ−t +
∞∑
τ=t+1
sτ
(1 + rS)
τ−t , (2)
where V At is the stand-alone enterprise value of the target if it were entirely equity financed, ∆t is the net
benefit of leverage (e.g., tax savings minus distress costs), Dt is the value of the target’s debt, and St is the
value of synergies between the bidder and the target.4
The bidder pays a price Bt for the target’s equity that is determined through bilateral Nash bargaining:
Bt = V
A
t + ∆t −Dt + αSt, (3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the seller’s relative bargaining power vis-a`-vis the bidder. The seller thus receives
the stand-alone value of the target’s equity plus a fraction α of the synergies.
The cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock in response to the bid (CARBiddert ) is equal to the
difference between the value of the target’s equity as assessed by the market (E˜t) and the price paid by the
bidder (Bt), scaled by the bidder’s market capitalization (EBiddert ), i.e.,
5
CARBiddert =
E˜t −Bt
EBiddert
. (4)
For ease of exposition, we now assume the following: (AI) The systematic risk of the synergies, debt,
and net benefits of leverage does not depend on the systematic risk of the target’s operating free cash flows
on a stand-alone basis. (AII) The empirical SML is flat. We relax both assumptions in Appendix III and
show that our key prediction is qualitatively unchanged as long as the empirical SML is not too steep.
4FCFτ are expected operating free cash flows on a stand-alone basis, δτ net benefits of leverage, dτ payments to debt holders,
and sτ synergies in period τ . The corresponding discount rates are rA, r∆, rD , and rS . We assume FCFτ ≥ 0 and sτ ≥ 0 for all
τ > t and FCFτ > 0 for at least one τ > t. We further assume that the target is financed only with equity Et and debt Dt and
does not hold excess cash. Otherwise, Dt should be interpreted as the value of all financing other than Et and net of excess cash.
5We assume that the bidder’s share of the gains or losses from the takeover accrues to the bidder’s shareholders rather than the
bidder’s creditors. Note also that being private does not imply that the market does not form a belief about the target’s value.
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Using rA = rf + βA × µ, the first assumption implies
∂Bt
∂βA
= − ∂rA
∂βA
×
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t)× FCFτ
(1 + rA)
τ−t+1 = −µ
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t)× FCFτ
(1 + rf + βA × µ)τ−t+1
< 0, (5)
where rf , βA, and µ denote the risk-free rate, target’s asset beta, and market risk premium.
The second assumption implies that the market’s assessment of the target’s equity value does not depend
on the target’s asset beta, i.e.,
∂E˜t
∂βA
= 0. (6)
It follows that
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
µ
EBiddert
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t)× FCFτ
(1 + rf + βA × µ)τ−t+1
> 0, (7)
which motivates our main prediction:
Prediction 1 The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement is increasing in the
target’s asset beta.
2.2 Additional Predictions
Our framework implies a number of additional predictions. We state each prediction below, together with a
short description of the underlying intuition. Appendix III provides formal derivations.
Prediction 2 The positive relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is stronger if the growth
rate of the target’s expected operating free cash flows on a stand-alone basis is larger.
Higher growth amplifies the difference between the value implied by the CAPM versus the empirical SML.
Prediction 3 The positive relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is stronger if the rela-
tive size of the bid vis-a`-vis the bidder’s market capitalization is larger.
Misvaluing a target has a bigger effect if the target is large relative to the bidder.
8
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Prediction 4 The positive relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is stronger if the bidder
relies more on the CAPM-based valuation of the target (relative to other valuation methods).
Bidders overvalue low- and undervalue high-beta targets relative to the market’s assessment because they
use the CAPM. Consequently, there is more over- or underpayment if bidders rely more on the CAPM.
Prediction 5 The positive relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is weaker if the empir-
ical SML has a steeper slope.
The reason why the CAPM-based value of a target differs from the market’s assessment thereof is that
the empirical SML is less steep than the CAPM-implied SML. Consequently, the difference between the
CAPM-based value and the market value becomes smaller when the empirical SML becomes steeper.
Prediction 6 The positive relation between the bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is weaker if the target
is publicly listed, in particular, if its asset beta is high.
As the current market valuations of public targets are observable, bidders are likely to rely relatively less on
the CAPM. Further, owners of public targets can sell their shares at the current price in the stock market.
Bids for high beta public targets (whose market prices exceed their CAPM-based values) must thus reflect
the beta-insensitive market prices. Both effects weaken the relation between bidder CARs and target betas.
3 Data
Data on takeover bids come from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum M&A database. We use all obser-
vations between 1977 and 2015 with a public bidder and a deal value of at least USD 50 million (inflation
adjusted to December 2015 terms). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.6 We distinguish between bids for
private targets (Panel A) and bids for public targets (Panel B).
6All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Definitions are provided in Appendix I.
9
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The average cumulative abnormal return of the bidders’ stock around the bid announcements (from
t = −3 to t = +3 for a bid announced on date t = 0) is positive for private targets (2.0%) and negative
for public targets (-0.6%), consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008;
Schneider and Spalt, 2019). The average deal value is USD 388 million for private and USD 1,258 million
for public targets (inflation-adjusted to December 2015 terms). Bidders offer an all-stock payment in 13%
(33%) of the cases if the target is private (public). The average discount rate used in fairness opinions on the
proposed deals is 14.1% for private and 13.1% for public targets.
The private (public) targets in our sample have an average asset beta of 0.86 (0.82) with a standard
deviation of 0.33 (0.36). The distribution of bidder asset betas is very similar. All betas are computed
as follows: First, for each public firm i in CRSP at the end of each month t, we regress monthly excess
stock returns (RET in CRSP minus the risk-free rate from K. French’s webpage7) during the previous
five years, i.e., from month t − 60 to month t, on the corresponding excess returns of the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio (including dividends). The regression coefficient is the CAPM (equity-)beta βEit .
8 To
ensure reasonable precision, we drop estimates based on less than 36 monthly returns. Further, we drop
observations for which the estimated beta is negative, and we drop the same number of observations in the
right tail of the distribution of estimated betas. Our findings are unchanged if we winsorize the estimates at
the 1% level instead. Second, we delever each beta using the formula βAit = β
E
it / [1 + (1− τ)×Dit/Eit],
where τ is the statutory tax rate in the highest bracket, Dit is total debt at the end of the most recently
completed fiscal year (DLT + DLC in Compustat), and Eit is the market capitalization of firm i at the
end of month t. Third, we compute the equally weighted average of βAit of all public firms in CRSP with
the same three-digit primary SIC code. Finally, we attribute to the target and bidder the equally weighted
average asset beta of their respective industries as of the last completed month before the bid announcement.
7http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
8We use sharecodes 10 and 11 and compute the value-weighted average beta in case of multiple securities per firm.
10
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Hence, if the bidder and target operate in the same industry, they have the same asset beta.
It is important to note that to test our predictions, we require estimates of the betas used by managers
in practice. Thus, our goal is not to estimate the “true” CAPM-betas but to replicate as closely as possible
the estimation procedure most likely used by the bidders in our sample. Consequently, we follow common
industry practice and rely on five years of monthly returns, use the standard (textbook) delevering formula,
and compute the equally weighted average asset beta of each target’s public peers. Our results, however, are
not materially affected when using alternative methodologies to estimate, delever, or aggregate betas.
4 Results
4.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Bidders’ Stock Around Bid Announcements
We now test our main prediction: The bidder’s cumulative abnormal return around the bid announcement
is increasing in the target’s asset beta (Prediction 1). For the purpose of this analysis, we focus on private
targets. Tests of our model’s differential predictions for public targets are provided in Section 4.5.
We estimate the following OLS regression:
Bidder CAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread + δ′Deal Controls (8)
Bidder CAR = α+ η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls + Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε
Bidder CAR is the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return during the seven days around the bid announcement
(i.e., from date t− 3 to date t+ 3 for a bid announced on date t = 0).9 Target Asset Beta is the target’s asset
beta. Beta Spread is the difference between the target’s and bidder’s asset beta. We include this variable
to control for the effect of bidders using their own beta rather than the target’s beta to compute the cost of
capital (Kru¨ger, Landier, and Thesmar, 2015). Deal Controls are characteristics that are commonly used
9Our findings are robust to using alternative event windows, e.g., from t− 2 to t+ 2 or from t− 1 to t+ 1.
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as control variables in the M&A literature.10 Specifically, we control for Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash,
Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder
Size (Log). Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. Target Controls are the target’s market-to-book
ratio, return on assets, and leverage, as well as cash holdings and cash flow (both scaled by assets).11 Bidder
Controls are defined analogously. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.12
Table 2 presents the results.13 In column (1), we do not include any control variables other than fixed
effects. We add the deal controls in column (2), target controls in column (3), and bidder controls in column
(4). In column (5), we also add Beta Spread. To conserve space, we do not report the coefficient estimates
and t-statistics of all control variables. The coefficient estimates on Target Asset Beta are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level in all five columns.14 The point estimates range from 1.02 in column
(1) to 2.55 in column (5) and imply that an increase in Target Asset Beta by its interquartile range (0.49) is
associated with an increase in Bidder CAR by 0.5 to 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to 6% to 16% of
Bidder CAR’s interquartile range (7.9%).
10See, e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012),
Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012), and Dessaint, Golubov, and Volpin (2017).
11For private firms, we use the equally weighted average of these variables computed across all public firms that operate in the
same industry (based on the first three digits of the firms’ primary SIC code).
12Our findings are unchanged if we use block bootstrap standard errors instead.
13The reported number of observations refers to the observations that are effectively used in the estimation procedure and varies
between the different columns because some control variables are not available for all observations and cases with only a single
observation for a given fixed effect (“singletons”) are dropped in an iterative procedure. This note applies to all subsequent tables.
14Table A.1 in Appendix II shows that this finding does not depend on the model used to estimate Bidder CAR. Table A.2 shows
that the results are similar when we use the targets’ equity betas instead of their asset betas. When controlling for Bidder Asset Beta
instead of Beta Spread, the coefficient on Target Asset Beta (Bidder Asset Beta) is 1.28 (1.22) with a t-statistic of 3.28 (2.41) in the
full sample and 0.95 (0.79) with a t-statistic of 1.90 (1.27) in the sub-sample where the two betas differ.
12
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4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Potential concerns regarding our analysis are measurement error and omitted, correlated variables. Specifi-
cally, the procedures and data that managers use in practice to estimate beta may differ from the procedures
and data we use to construct Target Asset Beta. In that case, Target Asset Beta = Beta Actually Used +
Measurement Error, and the OLS estimator would suffer from an attenuation bias. Target betas may also
be correlated with determinants of bidder CARs that are not captured by the control variables and fixed
effects. We control for the determinants that have been documented in the literature (e.g., Golubov, Yaw-
son, and Zhang, 2015; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Harford,
Humphery-Jenner, and Powell, 2012), but we cannot rule out that there might be other, omitted variables that
are (conditionally) correlated with both target asset betas and bidder CARs. As the existing literature does
not provide clear guidance on what these omitted variables may be and how they may be correlated with
target betas, however, we cannot make a clear-cut prediction whether the resulting bias in the OLS estimator
would be positive or negative. For example, if bidder hubris, synergies, or sellers’ relative bargaining power
were correlated with target asset betas, then the OLS estimator could be either upward or downward biased,
depending on the sign of the correlations between these variables and Target Asset Beta.
To mitigate the above-mentioned concerns, we construct an instrument for Target Asset Beta and esti-
mate the effect on bidder CARs in a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) framework. To do so, we rely on mutual
fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental variation in realized stock returns (i.e., noise), which in turn
translates into non-fundamental variation in beta-estimates (i.e., noise in the coefficient estimates from a
regression of excess stock on excess market returns). The intuition is as follows.
In practice, a firm’s equity-beta is typically estimated by regressing realized stock returns in excess of a
proxy for the risk free rate on realized excess returns of a market proxy. The beta-estimate is then defined as
β̂ ≡ σ̂r,m
σ̂2m
, (9)
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where σ̂r,m denotes the in-sample covariance between the excess stock return r and the excess market return
rm, and σ̂2m denotes the in-sample variance of rm.
15
The realized excess stock return can be written as the sum of a fundamental and a noise component,
r = r∗ + u, (10)
where r∗ denotes the fundamental component, and the noise component is defined as u ≡ r− r∗. It follows
that the beta-estimate (β̂) can be decomposed into a “fundamental beta” (β̂∗) and a “noise beta” (β̂u), i.e.,
β̂ =
σ̂r,m
σ̂2m
=
σ̂r∗,m
σ̂2m
+
σ̂u,m
σ̂2m
= β̂∗ + β̂u, (11)
where σ̂r∗,m and σ̂u,m are the in-sample covariances between r∗ and rm and u and rm. This decomposition
suggests that the scaled in-sample covariance (β̂u) between non-fundamental shocks to realized excess stock
returns and excess returns of the market proxy can be used as an instrument for the beta-estimate (β̂).
To implement this strategy, we rely on mutual fund fire sales as a source of non-fundamental variation
in realized returns. Coval and Stafford (2007) show that stock sales by funds that experience large outflows
create large, positive supply shocks for the liquidated stocks and thus have a negative impact on realized re-
turns. Fund managers, however, can exercise discretion when deciding which of their positions to liquidate.
To mitigate the concern that the decision which shares to sell introduces a correlation between fire sales and
fundamentals, we follow Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) and rely on hypothetical mutual fund fire
sales (HMFFS) rather than actual sales.16 In particular, for each stock, we compute the total dollar amount
of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales scaled by the total dollar amount of trading in the stock, assuming that
each position in an affected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its portfolio weight (so that the
15Some data providers (e.g., Bloomberg) also offer “adjusted beta” estimates that are a weighted average between the “raw beta”
estimate and one (e.g., β̂adj. = 23 × β̂ + 13 ). We abstract away from such adjustments as they complicate the exposition but do not
change the intuition behind our identification strategy.
16See also Lou (2012).
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overall composition of the portfolio remains unchanged).17 This approach ensures that the variable HMFFS
is not affected by fund managers’ discretion regarding which stocks to sell after a large outflow.18
Next, we use HMFFS to estimate the non-fundamental noise component in firms’ stock returns. Specif-
ically, for each public firm in the CRSP database and for each beta-estimation period in our sample, we
regress the firm’s realized excess stock return r on HMFFS,
r = α+ γ × HMFFS + υ. (12)
Importantly, because we estimate this regression separately for each firm and five-year beta-estimation pe-
riod, α in (12) is effectively a firm× estimation-period fixed effect that absorbs all characteristics that do
not vary during the five-year estimation period. The estimated effect of HMFFS is therefore only based on
within-firm, time-series variation during the estimation period but not on cross-sectional variation between
firms. This is worth noting because it mitigates the potential concern that the occurrence and extent of fire
sales may be correlated with the characteristics of the firms whose shares are sold.19
Next, we use the fitted value from (12) – the predicted excess return due to mutual fund fire sales – as
an estimate of the non-fundamental noise component in the return (i.e., û = γ̂ × HMFFS) and define20
β̂û ≡
σ̂û,m
σ̂2m
, (13)
where σ̂û,m is the in-sample covariance between the estimated noise component and the realized excess
return of the market proxy. Finally, in analogy to the construction of Target Asset Beta, we delever the firm-
17We provide a detailed description of the construction of HMFFS in Appendix IV.
18Wardlaw (2018) argues that scaling the amount of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales by the trading volume may be problematic
because it could lead to a correlation between HMFFS and returns for reasons other than the fire sales. We discuss this concern in
detail in Appendix V and show that our findings are robust to the use of alternative measures that are not subject to this critique.
19Berger (2019, p. 4), for example, argues that “large outflows are more likely among funds that invest in small firms.”
20It is not needed that HMFFS explains the entire noise term. In particular, assume that u is the sum of unexplained noise η and
noise ν due to mutual fund fire sales: r = r∗ + η+ ν. In that case, we have β̂ = β̂∗ + β̂η + β̂ν , so β̂ν can be used to instrument β̂.
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level estimates β̂û and compute the equally-weighted average at the industry level. The resulting variable,
denoted Target Noise Beta, is our instrument for Target Asset Beta.21
To be a valid instrument, Target Noise Beta must satisfy two conditions. First, it must be correlated
with Target Asset Beta. This condition can be tested using the first-stage of the 2SLS procedure. The
results show that the correlation between Target Noise Beta and Target Asset Beta is positive and highly
statistically significant (Table 3, Panel A). With t-statistics above ten, the implied F-statistics are an order
of magnitude larger than the threshold suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) to guard against weak
instruments.22 To mitigate concerns about the robustness of this finding, we explore the correlation between
the two variables in further detail. Figure A.1 in Appendix II shows the estimated coefficients from a
regression of Target Asset Beta on indicators for different ranges of Target Noise Beta. This analysis reveals
a strong and monotone relation that corroborates the first-stage results reported in Table 3, Panel A.
The second condition is that Target Noise Beta must be uncorrelated with the error term in the regression
of Bidder CAR on Target Asset Beta. The key exogeneity assumption in our setting is therefore that the
unexplained part of a bidder’s CAR around the bid for a private target is uncorrelated with the average
covariance between the market return and the estimated noise components in the returns of other, public
firms in the industry during the five years before the takeover bid: cov[Target Noise Beta, ε] = 0, where ε
is the error term in (8). A sufficient condition is that mutual fund fire sales are exogenous and introduce
21To ensure that Target Noise Beta and Target Asset Beta are constructed based on the same sample of observations, we exclude
β̂u-estimates if the corresponding β̂-estimates are missing. Further, we set Target Noise Beta to missing if the average estimated
effect of HMFFS on r at the industry level is in the top or bottom percentile of the sample distribution. This procedure mitigates
the concern that Target Noise Beta may be driven by outliers in the distribution of estimated noise components.
22Target Noise Beta is an estimated quantity, so the first-stage t-statistics may be overstated. Importantly, this does not affect the
asymptotic distribution of the second-stage estimator as long as Target Noise Beta is consistent and the error in the regression of
Bidder CAR on Target Asset Beta has a conditional mean of zero given the data used to estimate Target Noise Beta (Wooldridge,
2002). Both are maintained assumptions in our analysis. Further, note that even if the “true” t-statistics were up to three times
smaller than those reported, the implied F -statistics would still exceed the threshold suggested by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).
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random noise into the public firms’ excess stock returns. The evidence documented by a growing number
of papers supports this premise: Mutual fund fire sales trigger a drop in stock prices that is followed by
subsequent reversal, and corporate insiders trade against these shocks.23 Both findings are consistent with
the notion that mutual fund fire sales represent temporary, non-fundamental supply shocks.24
Importantly, however, this is not a necessary condition. Even if the fire sales were correlated with the
characteristics of the public firms in the funds’ portfolios, it is difficult to argue that this would translate
into a correlation between the average covariance of the market return and the estimated noise compo-
nents in the public firms’ excess returns (Target Noise Beta) and the unexplained part of a bidder’s CAR
around the bid for a different, private target several years after the fire sale – in particular, after condition-
ing on the large number of control variables and fixed effects in the regressions. Our exogeneity assumption
cov[Target Noise Beta, ε] = 0 is thus considerably weaker than the assumption that the mutual fund fire sales
themselves are exogenous. This is another reason why the potential concern that HMFFS may be correlated
with the characteristics of the firms whose shares are sold is unlikely to be important in our setting.
It is also unclear why the realized, in-sample covariance between excess market returns and non-
fundamental noise in the return realizations of public firms during the five years before a deal would affect
a bidder’s CAR around a bid announcement for a different, private firm through any channel other than
the effect on the beta estimate. Taken together, plausibly random assignment and a single channel through
which bidder CARs are affected suggest that Target Noise Beta satisfies the exclusion restriction.
Table 3 displays the results of the 2SLS estimation.25 In Panel A, columns (1) to (4), we present the
results of the first-stage regressions of Target Asset Beta on Target Noise Beta. In columns (5.a) and (5.b),
23Ali, Wei, and Zhou (2011); Goldman (2017); Dessaint, Foucault, Fre´sard, and Matray (2018); Honkanen and Schmidt (2018).
24Other papers using mutual fund fire sales as non-fundamental shocks to prices/returns include Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012), Phillips and Zhdanov (2013), Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez (2014), and Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn (2017).
25The sample period for this analysis is 1980 to 2015 as data on mutual funds flows is not available prior to 1980.
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we instrument Target Asset Beta and Beta Spread with Target Noise Beta and Bidder Noise Beta.26 The
coefficient estimates on Target Noise Beta in all columns are positive and strongly significant. Similarly, the
coefficient on Bidder Noise Beta in column (5.b) is negative and highly significant.
Panel B shows the second-stage results. The IV estimates of the coefficients on Target Asset Beta
are noisier than the corresponding OLS estimates reported in Table 2 but remain positive and statistically
significant – at the 5% level in columns (1), (3), and (4), at the 1% level in column (2), and at the 10%
level in column (5). Further, while estimated with lower precision, the IV estimates are comparable in
magnitude to the OLS estimates. Indeed, the 10% confidence intervals around the IV estimates include the
corresponding OLS estimates, and Durbin-Hausman-Wu tests indicate that the difference between the IV
and the OLS estimates is not statistically significant. The IV results thus corroborate our earlier findings of
a positive relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR.
The finding that the 2SLS estimates are a bit larger than (though not statistically different from) the OLS
estimates is consistent with the initially mentioned concern about a potential attenuation bias in the OLS
estimator. It is also worth noting that the IV estimates capture a local average effect that could potentially
differ from the average effect captured by OLS. Specifically, the IV coefficients capture the relation between
Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR for those acquisitions where the beta estimate used by the managers is
influenced by fire sale induced noise in stock returns. Imagine now that there is heterogeneity in bidder
sophistication: More sophisticated bidders know that simple regression betas can be distorted by noise and
therefore adjust the estimation procedure or put less emphasis on the CAPM-implied value of the target. In
that case, the IV coefficients would primarily reflect the relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR
for less sophisticated bidders who continue to use the CAPM with simple beta-estimates even when there is
fire sale induced noise. Hence, if less sophisticated bidders rely more on the textbook version of the CAPM
– thus generating a stronger relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR – then the local average
26We construct Bidder Noise Beta in analogy to Target Noise Beta.
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effect captured by the IV estimation could be larger than the average effect captured by OLS.
4.3 Model Calibration and Implied Valuation Errors
We now explore whether the magnitude of the regression coefficients that we estimate is consistent with the
model of Section 2. For this purpose, we assume that the bidder seeks to acquire a fraction pi ∈ [0, 1] of the
target’s equity and that the takeover succeeds with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1].27 In that case, our model implies
CARBiddert = ρ×
piE˜t −Bt
EBiddert
. (14)
We further make three simplifying assumptions: (I) The operating cash flows and synergies have the
same systematic risk and grow at a constant rate g. (II) The level of debt is permanent, and the net benefit of
leverage is equal to the tax shield. (III) The bidder, seller, and market use the book value of debt as a proxy
for the debt’s market value. We show in Appendix III that the bidder’s CAR can then be written as
CARBiddert =
ρ
EBiddert
×
{
pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)×
[
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
]
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g
}
. (15)
Finally, we assume that the CAPM-implied and empirical SML cross at the average asset beta (βA) and
allow for different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML, so that discount rate used by the market is
r˜A = rf +
[
γ × βA + (1− γ)× βA
]× µ, (16)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] determines the steepness of the empirical SML (relative to the CAPM). For example, γ = 0
means that the empirical SML is flat, and γ = 1 means that the empirical and CAPM-implied SML coincide.
We then use Equations (15) and (16) to compute CARBiddert for different values of βA. We assume the
following parameter values: We set ρ equal to 0.92 and EBiddert equal to USD 10,269 million based on the
average bidder market value and bid acceptance rate in the sample of 12,109 observations used to estimate
column (5) in Table 2. We use the average yield on 20-year U.S. treasury bonds during the sample period
27Unlike in the model in Section 2, some bids in the data fail. We introduce the parameter ρ to capture this empirical pattern.
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(5.0%) as a proxy for rf , the average nominal GDP growth (5.4%) to proxy for g, and we assume a market
risk premium (µ) of 6%. We use the average asset beta of all public firms in Compustat (0.84) to proxy for
βA, set α to 0.5, and consider three different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML: γ = 0, γ = 0.5,
and γ = 1. Finally, we set st+1 and pi (FCFt+1 + st+1) to the values implied by st+1 = S˜t (r˜A − g) and 28
pi (FCFt+1 + st+1) = Bt [1 + (1− τ)L] (rA − g) + st+1 [1− α+ (1− τ)L (1− pi − α)] , (17)
which we compute using the average synergy value (S˜t) of USD 58 million that we estimate based on the
combined CARs of bidders and targets around bids for public firms, the average bid value (Bt) of USD 314
million, average tax rate (τ) of 36%, average ratio of debt to equity (L) of 0.59, and average target asset
beta of 0.9 in the sample used to estimate column (5) in Table 2. All other parameter values are as before.
Next, we compute the implied coefficients in a regression of CARBiddert on indicator variables for different
ranges of βA, relative to the base case of βA = 0.9. We contrast these model-implied coefficients with the
actual coefficients obtained in our empirical analysis. Figure 1 presents the results. The dashed blue line
shows the model-implied coefficients for a flat empirical SML (γ = 0) and the dashed gray line for an
empirical SML that coincides with the CAPM (γ = 1). The solid blue line corresponds to an empirical
SML that is half as steep as the CAPM-implied SML (γ = 0.5). The solid red line shows the coefficient
estimates from our empirical analysis (using the same controls as in column (5) of Table 2).29 Overall,
except for very low asset betas, the model fits the empirical relation between Bidder CAR and Target Asset
Beta reasonably well. Put differently, our regression estimates are quantitatively consistent with our model.
Our model also allows us to assess the magnitude of the valuation error (relative to the market’s view)
that is due to managers’ reliance on the CAPM. The idea is that we observe the actual bids Bt in the data
and can use the model to back-out the implied counterfactual bids B˜t that would have been made had
the managers relied on the empirical SML instead of the CAPM. The implied valuation error can then be
28We derive this relation in Appendix III.
29We report the numerical values of these coefficient estimates in Table A.3 in Appendix II.
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computed as the absolute value of the difference between the actual and counterfactual bids, where we use
the absolute value because all losses to bidders are gains to targets (and vice versa).
Specifically, for each completed takeover in our sample, we estimate the valuation error as30
|Bt − B˜t| = |(1− α) st+1 − pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)| ×
∣∣∣∣ 1r˜A − g − 1rA − g
∣∣∣∣ , (18)
where we use st+1 = S˜t (r˜A − g) and
pi (FCFt+1 + st+1) = Bt [1 + (1− τ)L] (rA − g) + st+1 [1− α+ (1− τ)L (1− pi − α)] (19)
computed using the bid-specific values of Bt, pi, and βA as well as (target SIC3-) industry specific estimates
of S˜t, τ , and L. For all other model parameters, we make the same assumptions as before.
The valuation errors implied by this analysis correspond, on average, to 23% of the deal values (66
million per takeover in U.S. dollar terms, inflation adjusted to December 2015). This model-implied estimate
is in line with the estimates obtained from regressing Bidder Car on Target Asset Beta (Tables 2 and 3),
which provide an alternative way to gauge the valuation errors. Specifically, for each deal, we can compute
the regression-implied valuation error by multiplying the coefficient estimate on Target Asset Beta with
the absolute difference between Target Asset Beta and 0.84 (our estimate of βA) and the bidder’s market
capitalization. Doing so implies average valuation errors of 12% to 33% of the deal values (based on the
coefficient estimates reported in columns (1) to (5) of Table 2).31
30We derive Equation (18) in Appendix III.
31As a robustness check, we have also computed the model-implied valuation errors using equity instead of asset betas. Doing so
yields valuation errors that correspond, on average, to 14% of the deal values (38 million in U.S. dollar terms, inflation adjusted to
December 2015). A point worth noting is that the model-implied estimates correspond to the valuation errors that are due to using
the CAPM in the M&A context, not the total errors due to using the CAPM in general. An implication is that the model-implied
estimates of the valuation errors in the M&A context may understate the total errors from using the CAPM across all contexts.
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4.4 Cross-Sectional Variation
We now test Predictions 2 to 5 regarding cross-sectional variation in the relation between bidder CARs and
target asset betas. To do so, we define five indicators. Target Growth High is equal to one if the growth rate
of aggregate sales in the target’s industry over the past three years is larger than the sample median. Target
Relative Size High is equal to one if the relative size of the bid vis-a`-vis the bidder’s market capitalization
is larger than the sample median. Bidder Mentions CAPM is equal to one if the words “CAPM” or “Capital
Asset Pricing Model” occur in the bidder’s 10K, 10Q, and 8K filings during the three years prior to the bid
announcement. Listed Peer Available is equal to one if the target is a U.S. firm, and there is at least one other
publicly listed U.S. firm with the same primary three-digit SIC code whose market capitalization is neither
smaller than 50% nor larger than 150% of the target’s bid-implied equity value. The idea is that a comparable
public peer should come from the same geographic region, operate in the same industry, and have a similar
size. We use Bidder Mentions CAPM and Listed Peer Available as proxies for bidders’ reliance on the
CAPM relative to other valuation methods. The intuition is that bidders who rely on the CAPM should
be more likely to mention the CAPM, and that bidders are more likely to complement a CAPM-based
valuation with a multiple-based valuation if there are comparable, publicly listed peers. Finally, we define
the indicator Steep Empirical SML that is equal to one if, during the month of the bid announcement, the
slope of the empirical SML estimated following Hong and Sraer (2016) is larger than the sample median.32
Next, we estimate OLS regressions in which we interact Target Asset Beta with the above indicators.33
Table 4 presents the results. We find that the relation between bidder CARs and target betas is stronger if
the growth in the target’s industry is high and if the bid is large relative to the bidder’s market capitalization.
Further, the relation is stronger if the bidder is more likely to rely on the CAPM (as proxied by Bidder
Mentions CAPM) and weaker if the bidder is more likely to complement a CAPM-based valuation with a
32We thank David Sraer for sharing the code and data.
33We also interact all controls and fixed effects with the indicators, thus allowing their coefficients to vary with the indicators.
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multiple valuation (as proxied by Listed Peer Available).34 Finally, the relation is weaker when the empirical
SML is steep. All of these findings support the cross-sectional predictions that are implied by our model.35
4.5 Private vs. Public Targets
We now test Prediction 6. Specifically, we consider both private and public targets and examine whether
and how the relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas varies between the two types of targets.
The key difference between a private and a public target in our model is the seller’s outside option when
negotiating with the bidder. The owners of a public target can decide between accepting the bid, keeping the
shares, and selling the shares at their current price in the stock market. The owners of a private target can
only choose between selling to the bidder and retaining the shares. The owners of a public target thus have
a better outside option when bargaining with the bidder, in particular, when the target’s CAPM-beta is high
(i.e., when the market price is larger than the CAPM-implied value). Further, because the market price is
less sensitive to beta than the CAPM-implied value, the relation between the target’s beta and the takeover
price offered by the bidder (and thus ultimately the bidder’s CAR) is weaker for high beta public targets.
Another difference between private and public targets is the ease with which observable prices can be
used to complement a CAPM-based valuation. For a public target, the bidder may consider not only the
CAPM-based value but also the target’s current market capitalization. For a private target, the market prices
of public firms that are deemed “comparable” may play a role (e.g., in the form of valuation multiples).
We consider this possibility in an extension of our model (in Appendix III). In particular, we assume that
34Similarly, we find that the relation is weaker if the fairness opinions on the proposed deals include multiple valuations based
on comparable, traded peers. A caveat is that this information is only available for a very small subsample of the deals.
35The finding that the relation between Bidder CAR and Target Asset Beta is stronger if the relative deal size is larger is consistent
not only with our model but also with alternative models in which bidder CARs and target betas are related for reasons other than
managers’ use of the CAPM. Taken in isolation, this finding does thus not distinguish our model from such alternatives. However,
the sum of our cross-sectional findings, all of which are predicted by our model, is difficult to reconcile with alternative explanations.
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the bidder’s assessment of the target’s equity value is a weighted average of the CAPM-based value and
another, market-based value (e.g., the current market price for a public target and a multiple-implied value
for a private target). As a current market price is arguably considered a more accurate assessment than
a multiple-implied value, we conjecture that the weight given to a public target’s market capitalization is
higher than the weight given to a multiple-implied value for a private target. Thus, because the market-based
value is less sensitive to beta than the CAPM-based value, we expect the takeover bid (and consequently,
the bidder’s announcement CAR) to be less sensitive to the target’s asset beta if the target is public.
To test this prediction, we regress Bidder CAR on Target Asset Beta separately for private and public
targets. Table 5 shows the results for private targets in columns (1) to (3) and for public targets in columns
(4) to (6). Columns (1) and (4) correspond to column (5) of Table 2. We find a positive and statistically
significant relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas for private targets but not for public targets.
Columns (2) and (5) show the coefficient estimates for variables indicating whether a target’s asset beta
falls within the bottom or top quartile of the sample distribution. For both private and public targets, the
results indicate that bids for targets with betas in the bottom quartile of the distribution are associated with
lower bidder CARs (relative to bids for targets with betas in the middle of the distribution). Bids for targets
with betas in the top quartile, however, are associated with higher bidder CARs only for private but not for
public targets. The null-hypothesis that the coefficients on 1 {Target Asset Beta > p75} in columns (2) and
(5) are the same is rejected by a Wald test at the 10% level and at the 5% level by a Fisher non-parametric
permutation test based on 5,000 simulations (see, e.g., Cleary, 1999).
Columns (3) and (6) show the estimated coefficients on indicators for different ranges of asset betas. For
private targets, we find negative and significant coefficients for low asset betas and positive and significant
coefficients for high asset betas (relative to bids for targets with asset betas in the middle of the distribution).
For public targets, the coefficient estimates are negative and significant for low asset betas but not statistically
different from zero for high asset betas. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of these findings. For
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private targets, the relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR is positive over the entire range of
asset betas. In contrast, the relation for public targets is only significant if the asset betas are low. For
high-beta public targets, the relation is much flatter and not statistically significant.
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) of Table 5, we pool the bids for private and public targets. The regression
in column (7) corresponds to the one in columns (1) and (4) – except for the indicator Public Target that we
include as an additional control. The estimated coefficient on Target Asset Beta is positive and statistically
significant. This shows that the relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR is significantly positive
not only in the sample of bids for private targets but also in the pooled sample of all bids. The coefficient
on Public Target is negative and significant, consistent with prior studies that document lower bidder CARs
around bids for public targets (e.g., Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2008; Schneider and Spalt, 2019). In
column (8), we again use the pooled sample of all bids but interact Target Asset Beta with Public Target,
thus allowing the relation between Target Asset Beta and Bidder CAR to vary with the targets’ listing status.36
We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient estimate on Target Asset Beta and a negative and
significant estimate on the interaction with Public Target.
4.6 Probability of Receiving Takeover Bids
Our model also has implications for the probability with which public firms receive takeover bids. A bid for a
public firm is only made if the firm’s CAPM-implied equity value exceeds its current market capitalization.
Hence, because the CAPM-implied equity value is decreasing in beta (whereas the market capitalization
is less sensitive to beta), a public firm’s probability of receiving a takeover bid should be decreasing in its
36We also interact Public Target with all control variables and fixed effects.
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beta.37 To test this prediction, we estimate the following OLS regression for all public firms in Compustat:38
Bidt = α+ β × Asset Betat−1 + γ′Firm Characteristicst−1 + Year × IPO Cohort Fixed Effects + ε. (20)
We distinguish between two types of bids. Controlling Bid is an indicator equal to one if a firm receives
an offer from a bidder that seeks to acquire a controlling stake. Any Bid is equal to one if a firm receives
any bid (i.e., controlling or not). Asset Beta is our estimate of firms’ asset beta, and Firm Characteristics
is a vector of control variables that have been used in the literature to explain takeover probabilities (e.g.,
Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Cremers, Nair, and John, 2009): Assets
(Log), ROA, Debt to Assets, Cash to Assets, Cash Flow to Assets, Tobin’s Q, PPE to Assets, and IO Block.39
Each firm’s IPO cohort is defined by the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in CRSP.
Table 6 shows the results. The estimated coefficients on Asset Beta are negative in all four columns and
statistically significant at the 10% level in column (1) and at the 5% level in columns (2) to (4). This finding
supports the prediction that public firms’ probability of receiving bids decreases with their asset beta.40
A closely related prediction is that the average beta of private targets is larger than that of public targets.
The intuition is that the owners of private firms do not have the outside option of selling their shares in the
stock market. Consequently, while public targets tend to have lower average betas as successful bids must
exceed their beta-insensitive market valuations, this effect is less present for private targets. As a result,
private targets tend to have higher betas than public targets. A simple t-test suggests that the average asset
37We provide a formal derivation of this prediction in Appendix III.
38Descriptive statistics for this sample are presented in Table A.4 in Appendix II. The data in SDC are very sparse before 1981,
so we cannot reliably identify the occurrence or absence of bids in earlier years. The sample period is thus 1981 to 2015. Note also
that we cannot examine the relation between private firms’ betas and the probability of receiving takeover bids because we only
observe those private firms that receive bids but not the private firms that do not receive bids and thus do not show up in our data.
39The explanatory variables for a bid in year t are measured at the end of year t−1. The standard errors are clustered by industry.
40An unreported robustness check confirms that the estimated coefficients on Asset Beta are also negative and statistically signif-
icant if we estimate a conditional logit model instead of the linear probability model reported in Table 6.
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beta of the private targets in our data is indeed larger than that of the public targets. When we cluster the
standard errors by target industry, the difference in average asset betas becomes statistically insignificant
if we only consider acquisitions with non-missing deal values of at least USD 50 million (as we do in our
analyses of bidder CARs). However, the difference remains significant if we consider all acquisitions by
U.S. bidders in SDC (excluding share repurchases).
4.7 Method of Payment
We now examine the relation between bidders’ asset betas and the method of payment in takeovers. Bidders
who believe their own stock to be overvalued by the market are more likely to propose payment in stock
than in cash (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Hence, if bidders rely on the CAPM when assessing the value
of their own equity, high beta bidders should be more likely than low beta bidders to propose stock as the
method of payment.41 To test this prediction, we estimate the following OLS regression:
100% Stock = α+ β × Bidder Asset Beta + γ × Target Asset Beta + δ′Deal Controls (21)
100% Stock = α+ η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls + Target Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε,
where 100% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the bidder proposes to pay entirely with stock.42 Bidder
(Target) Asset Beta are the bidder’s and target’s asset beta. All other variables are defined as before. The
standard errors are clustered by bidder industry.
Table 7 presents the results. The estimated coefficients on Bidder Asset Beta are positive and statistically
significant in all five columns, supporting the prediction that high beta bidders are more likely to offer stock
based payment rather than cash. This is consistent with Baker, Hoeyer, and Wurgler’s (2019) finding that
firms’ leverage decreases with beta. In the same spirit, another related prediction would be that, even in the
41An implicit assumption is that bidders do not perceive cash as being equally misvalued as equity.
42Table A.5 in Appendix II shows that our findings are robust to using other variables to capture the propensity to pay with stock,
and Table A.6 shows that using equity betas rather than asset betas does not change the results.
27
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
absence of M&A activity, high beta firms should be more likely to issue equity and less likely to repurchase
shares. We present in Appendix VII empirical evidence that is consistent with this prediction.
5 Alternative Explanations
5.1 Do Managers Really Use the CAPM?
Our prediction of a positive relation between bidder CARs and target betas rests on the premise that man-
agers use the CAPM to compute discount rates. Surveys among corporate executives and valuation profes-
sionals support this assumption: The vast majority of respondents state that they always or almost always
use the CAPM (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Jacobs and Shivdasani, 2012; Mukhlynina and Nyborg, 2016).
To provide further support, we test the basic implication that the discount rate used to value a target is
increasing in its asset beta. To do so, we obtain data on the maximum and minimum discount rates used in
fairness opinions on the proposed takeovers. SDC Platinum provides this information for 1,181 bids in our
sample. For each of these bids, we compute the average of the maximum and minimum discount rate used
in the fairness opinion (Avg. Discount Rate) and estimate by OLS:43
Avg. Discount Rate = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread (22)
α+ δ × Deal Value (Log) + η × Public Target + Year Fixed Effects + ε.
We control for Deal Value (Log) and Public Target because the providers of fairness opinions may adjust
the discount rate upwards for small and private targets due to their lower liquidity.
43We use a simple average of the two discount rates for simplicity. If the providers of the fairness opinions pick the maximum
and minimum discount rate so that the average target value that is implied by the two rates is equal to the actual bid (thereby making
the bid look “fair”), then a simple average overestimates the actual discount rate used for the bid. The reason is Jensen’s inequality:
1
2
(
1
rmax
+ 1
rmin
)
= 1
ractual
⇒ Avg. Discount Rate ≡ rmax+rmin
2
≥ 2
(
1
rmax
+ 1
rmin
)−1
= ractual. An alternative would thus be to use a
harmonic average, i.e., to define Avg. Discount Rate ≡ 2
(
1
rmax
+ 1
rmin
)−1
. Doing so does not qualitatively change our findings.
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Panel A of Table 8 presents the results. In column (1), we only control for year fixed effects. In column
(2), we add Deal Value (Log) and Public Target. In column (3), we add Beta Spread. The standard errors
are clustered by target industry. The coefficient estimate on Target Asset Beta is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in all three columns. This finding supports the premise that the CAPM is used
to estimate discount rates in practice. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate (3% to 4%) is likely to be
a lower bound for the market risk premium used in the fairness opinions. One reason is an attenuation bias
due to measurement error: Target Asset Beta may be a noisy estimate of the beta actually used to compute
the discount rate. Another reason is that, for public targets, fairness opinion providers may upward-adjust
(downward-adjust) the market risk premium used to compute the discount rate if the implied value of the
target exceeds (falls short of) its current market capitalization by a sufficiently large amount. Adjusting the
market risk premium – and thus the discount rate – in this manner to bring the fairness opinion closer to the
current market price naturally reduces the coefficient estimate on Target Asset Beta in our regressions.
Another way to assess if the CAPM is used in practice is to examine how closely the cost of capital that
is implied by Target Asset Beta corresponds to the average discount rate that is used in the fairness opinions
(Avg. Discount Rate). In Appendix VI, we thus regress this average discount rate on the cost of capital that
is implied by Target Asset Beta when making the same assumptions regarding all other parameters as in
the model calibration in Section 4.3. We find that the “Target Asset Beta-implied” cost of capital indeed
corresponds closely to the variable Avg. Discount Rate precisely in those cases where the spread between
the maximum and minimum rate in the fairness opinion is small, i.e., if the midpoint between the two rates
is more likely to be an accurate estimate of the discount rate that was actually used by the bidder.
We also test another basic implication of using the CAPM: The bidder’s assessment of the target’s value
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and the takeover premium are decreasing in beta. Specifically, we estimate by OLS:
Bid-Implied Valuation (Premium) = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread (23)
α+ δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls
α+ Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε,
where Bid Implied Valuation and Premium are the value of the target and the takeover premium as implied
by the bid. All other variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. In column (1), we use the natural logarithm of the value of the bid
(in USD million) as the dependent variable.44 In column (2), we us the bid-implied firm value (FV) scaled
by the target’s sales. In column (3), we scale the firm value by EBIT.45 In column (4), we use the bid-implied
premium relative to the target’s market capitalization six months prior to the bid announcement.46
The coefficient estimates on Target Asset Beta are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in
all four columns. This is important for three reasons. First, it corroborates the premise that the CAPM is used
to compute discount rates. Second, it supports the basic prediction that a bidder’s assessment of a target’s
value is decreasing in the target’s asset beta. Third, it suggests that acquisitions of high beta targets do not
generate larger synergies than acquisitions of low beta targets. Otherwise, one would expect the bid-implied
valuations and premiums to be increasing in beta. This last point is important as it implies that the positive
relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas is unlikely to be driven by a positive correlation between
the targets’ asset betas and the value of synergies. The findings in Table 8 also give additional credibility
to our measure Target Asset Beta. Although this measure may be noisy, it is strongly correlated with the
average discount rate used in fairness opinions and the bid-implied valuations and takeover premiums.
44As a consequence, we do not include Deal Value (Log) as a control variable in column (1).
45Information on sales and EBIT is missing for non-U.S. targets in our sample. The indicator for cross-boarder bids (Crossborder)
is therefore not included in columns (2) and (3).
46Our findings are robust to using the 1-day, 1-month, 3-month, or 9-month premium instead.
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5.2 Do CAPM-Betas Correlate with Future Cash Flows or Synergies?
A potential concern regarding the interpretation of our findings is that firms’ asset betas may be correlated
with the firms’ expected free cash flows or the synergies that can be generated by a takeover. In that case,
bids for high beta targets may entail higher bidder CARs because acquisitions of high beta firms create
more value. Our IV analysis suggests that such biases cannot be too large (as the IV estimates are not
statistically different from the OLS estimates) but to double check, we now examine the relation between
firms’ asset betas and future (realized) free cash flows as well as the relation between targets’ asset betas
and the combined cumulative abnormal returns of bidders and targets.
We begin with the relation between asset betas and future (realized) free cash flows and estimate the
following OLS regression for all public firms in Compustat between 1977 and 2015:
FCF
Assets
= α+ β × Asset Beta + γ′Firm Characteristics + Year Fixed Effects + ε. (24)
FCF/Assets is free cash flows scaled by total assets.47 Firm Characteristics comprises the following
variables: Market Capitalization (Log), Market-to-Book, Cash to Assets, Debt to Assets, ROA, and Cash
Flow to Assets. All variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by industry.
Table 9 presents the results. We do not find any evidence of a relation between asset betas and future
free cash flows. This result suggests that the relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas is unlikely
to be driven by a correlation between asset betas and free cash flows.
Next, we assess the relation between synergies and asset betas by regressing the combined CARs of
47FCF/Assets is [EBIT× (1− τ) + D&A− CAPEX−∆NWC] /ASSETS, where τ is the tax rate, D&A depreciation and
amortization, CAPEX capital expenditures, ∆NWC the increase in net working capital, and ASSETS the book value of total assets.
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bidders and targets (Combined CAR) on the targets’ asset betas.48 Specifically, we estimate by OLS:
Combined CAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread + δ′Deal ControlsXXXXXXXX (25)
+η′Target Controls + κ′Bidder Controls + Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε
All variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
Table 10 presents the results. We do not find any evidence of a relation between Target Asset Beta and
Combined CAR. This result is another piece of evidence suggesting that the relation between bidder CARs
and target asset betas is not driven by unobserved differences in synergies.
6 Are CAPM-Using Managers Rational?
6.1 Why Do Managers Use the CAPM?
Our findings raise the question why managers use the CAPM in the first place. We do not take a strong
stance on this issue. Instead, based on existing survey evidence and the CAPM’s prominent role in major
textbooks, we take the use of the CAPM as given and focus on the consequences thereof.49 Nonetheless, we
now delineate a number of potential explanations for the widespread use of the CAPM in practice.
One possibility is that the CAPM is the true model of the relation between risk and expected returns
in the long run, but that the stock market is inefficient. In that case, using the CAPM can be optimal for
rational managers that seek to maximize the long-term value of financially unconstrained firms – even if
returns deviate from the CAPM in the short run (Stein, 1996).50 Another possibility is that the CAPM is
48A caveat is that we can compute the combined CAR of bidders and targets only if the targets are public.
49E.g., Berk and DeMarzo (2017), Brealy, Myers, Allen (2016), Graham and Harvey (2001), Jacobs and Shivdasani (2012),
Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016), and Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, and Jordan (2016).
50It is further possible that the CAPM is the correct model of the relation between risk and expected returns for firms’ individual
investment projects but not for the firms’ shares, which are backed not only by the firms’ projects but also by the real options to
start, modify, or abandon these projects (Berk, Green, and Naik, 1999; Da, Guo, and Jagannathan, 2012).
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not the true model but that managers are not aware of this. In particular, corporate managers and their
M&A advisors may not be aware of the relation between target betas and bidder CARs. Learning about this
relation may be difficult because most managers experience only a limited number of takeovers and thus
receive only infrequent feedback on their M&A decisions. M&A advisors experience a larger number of
deals but are typically organized in sector teams and specialize on particular industries. As a result, they
may not experience sufficient variation in target betas to learn about the relation to bidder CARs. It is also
possible that managers and their advisors are aware of the divergence between CAPM-implied and realized
returns but that they underestimate the extent to which the CAPM fails empirically or the importance of using
accurate discount rates. In that case, they may prefer to use the CAPM instead of alternative models that are
more accurate but also more difficult to implement or communicate to clients, colleagues, or superiors.
Related to the question why corporate managers and their M&A advisors use the CAPM is the question
why other investors (e.g., traders in the stock market) use different models. One possibility are differences in
rationality: Corporate managers and their M&A advisors may be irrational while market traders are rational
or vice versa. Differences in beliefs may then lead to differences in model usage. Another possibility is that
corporate managers, M&A advisors, and market traders are constrained (e.g., in terms of time, attention, or
resources) and in response focus on what they believe to be their relative advantage: Managers may believe
that they create value through real actions (e.g., choosing a better corporate strategy or developing better
products) rather than identifying undervalued assets. Consequently, they may be willing to rely on of-the-
shelve valuation techniques, including the CAPM, even though they know that these techniques are not
perfect. M&A advisors may see their competitive advantage in negotiating takeovers and deal management,
not in estimating discount rates.51 Market traders, instead, who focus on identifying misvalued assets, may
51Consistent with this view, Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016, p. 1) quote one of the respondents to their survey as saying: “There
seem to be lots of academics asking how analysts in the real world use CAPM or calculate the cost of capital. The answer is, people
don’t waste time on this. No one ever lost/made money because they calculated the WACC better than consensus.”
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see their edge in using better valuation models than the CAPM.
6.2 Should Managers Use the CAPM?
Closely related to the question why managers use the CAPM is the normative question if they should use
the CAPM. The answer depends crucially on the question of market efficiency. One possibility is that the
stock market is efficient in the sense that prices reflect fundamentals and expected returns compensation
for risk only. This would imply that the difference between the empirical SML and the CAPM-implied
SML reflects compensation for risk, and the higher (lower) bidder CARs around bids for higher (lower) beta
targets are due to valuation mistakes by CAPM-using managers. This view would be consistent with the
lack of conclusive evidence in favor of the CAPM in the existing asset pricing literature. In that case, the
normative implication is that managers should not use the CAPM but instead rely on whatever statistical
model provides the best estimate of the relation between project risk and expected returns (Stein, 1996).
The other possibility is that the market is inefficient, and the higher (lower) bidder CARs around bids
for higher (lower) beta targets are due to temporary mispricing by the market. In that case, managers should
use the model that correctly maps risk to expected returns in the long run – even if it has no predictive power
in the short run (Stein, 1996).52 That is, if the market is inefficient, managers should use the CAPM if it is
the “true” model of the relation between risk and expected returns.53 This would be consistent with Cohen,
Polk, and Vuolteenaho’s (2009) finding that betas based on accounting cash flows forecast long-term returns.
The answer to the question “Should managers use the CAPM?” thus depends on the answer to (1) “Is the
stock market efficient in the sense that prices reflect fundamentals and expected returns compensation for
52We assume here that the objective is to maximize the long-term value of financially unconstrained firms. If firms are financially
constrained or managers interested in maximizing short-term stock prices, it can be optimal to rely on whatever statistical model
produces the best prediction of returns in the short run – even if the predictability is due to mispricing (Stein, 1996).
53This poses the well-known conundrum that it is difficult to empirically validate the CAPM with data generated in an inefficient
market, i.e., if realized prices and returns may reflect mispricing rather than fundamentals and compensation for risk.
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risk only?” and, if not, (2) “Is the CAPM the true model of the relation between risk and expected returns?”54
We (and the existing asset pricing literature) cannot provide a definitive answer to these questions. However,
in what follows, we present some suggestive evidence that managers should not use the CAPM (at least not
in its simple, text-book form and in an M&A context).
6.3 Some Suggestive Evidence
We first examine bidders’ abnormal returns in the long run. The idea is as follows. If the CAPM is a good
model of expected returns in the long run, then the relation between bidder abnormal returns and target asset
betas observed during short periods around bid announcements should disappear over longer horizons as the
market eventually learns that managers were right to use the CAPM. We thus compute the bidders’ buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (Bidder BHAR) over different horizons and estimate the following OLS regression:
Bidder BHAR = α+ β × Target Asset Beta + γ × Beta Spread + δ′Deal Controls + η′Target Controls
α+ κ′Bidder Controls + Bidder Industry × Year Fixed Effects + ε. (26)
All explanatory variables are defined as before. The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
Table A.8 shows the results. Column (1) mirrors the findings of Table 2. The bidders’ buy-and-hold
abnormal returns during the seven-days around the bid announcements are increasing in the targets’ asset
betas. Columns (2) to (5) show no evidence of subsequent reversal: The abnormal buy-and-hold returns are
not statistically different from zero starting from four trading days after the bid announcements. The positive
and statistically significant coefficient estimates in columns (6) to (9) corroborate this result: Bidder BHARs
from three trading days before the bid announcements up to 400 trading days after the announcements are
positively related to target asset betas. This finding suggests that bidders’ use of the CAPM has long-lasting
wealth effects for investors. A caveat is that this test lacks power (as do most long-run return studies).
54The well-documented discrepancy between the empirical SML and the CAPM-implied SML is inconsistent with the hypothesis
that the market is efficient and the CAPM true, so we do not consider this alternative.
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As a second test, we examine if the relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas depends on
bidders’ corporate governance and managerial entrenchment. The idea is rooted in bounded rationality:
Using a more accurate model than the CAPM is cognitively costly, so managers only do it when they have
something to gain from it. Assuming that better governance and lower entrenchment make managers act
more in line with what shareholders want, bidders with better corporate governance and less entrenched
managers should thus be less likely to use the CAPM if shareholders believe that doing so is “wrong.”
To test this prediction we estimate OLS regressions in which we interact Target Asset Beta with prox-
ies for bidder governance and entrenchment:55 Institutional Ownership is the fraction of shares owned
by institutional investors. Insider Ownership is the fraction of shares owned by the five highest paid ex-
ecutives. Wealth Performance Sensitivity is the performance sensitivity measure of Edmans, Gabaix, and
Landier (2009). Board Independence is the fraction of independent directors. Anti Takeover Index is the anti
takeover index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferell (2004). The standard errors are clustered by target industry.
Table 12 presents the results. We find that the relation between bidder CARs and target betas is signif-
icantly weaker if the bidders have higher institutional ownership, if the bidder CEOs’ wealth-performance-
sensitivity is higher, and if the bidders’ management is less entrenched through anti-takeover provisions.
The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between Target Asset Beta and Insider Ownership and
Board Independence are also negative, but not statistically significant.
In sum, the results indicate that better governance and lower entrenchment make bidders less likely to use
the CAPM. One possible explanation for this finding is that shareholders know that the CAPM is “wrong”
but that using a more accurate model is cognitively costly, so that managers only do so if governance is
good or entrenchment low. Another possibility, however, is that shareholders merely believe that the CAPM
is “wrong” – even though it is not. Consequently, the results of Table 12 cannot conclusively rule out the
possibility that the CAPM is “right.”
55We also interact all controls and fixed effects.
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As using the CAPM appears not be what shareholders want, a natural question is what should be done
instead. Ultimately, managers of unconstrained firms with long horizons should use the model that correctly
describes the true relation between risk and expected returns (Stein, 1996). The problem is that there is no
agreement in the existing asset pricing literature on what this model is. This lack of consensus prevents us
from providing a clear-cut prescription which model should be used. A pragmatic approach might be to start
with the CAPM, which is appealing for both its simplicity and theoretical foundation, but to shrink the beta
estimates as suggested in Levi and Welch (2017). This would be consistent with an interpretation of our
results whereby managers overestimate the slope of the true SML. The results could then be complemented
with estimates from multi-factor or characteristics based models, models that exploit information in option
prices, and valuations based on multiples, so as to produce a valuation range for a potential takeover target.56
7 Conclusion
The CAPM is the predominant model of risk and return taught by academics and used by practitioners to
estimate the cost of capital. However, the CAPM does not fit the data: The empirical SML is flatter than
the CAPM implies. We show that the widespread use of the CAPM has real effects, in particular, for firms’
capital budgeting decisions and the market’s reaction thereto. Using M&A data on bids for private targets,
we show that acquirers experience significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns when announcing bids
for low rather than high beta targets and estimate that using the CAPM in this context leads to valuation
errors (relative to the market’s view) that correspond, on average, to 12% to 33% of the deal values.
The normative implications of our study ultimately depend on how the debate about the veracity of
the CAPM is settled. One view is that the CAPM holds in the long-run, but that the market is inefficient.
According to this view, our findings reflect temporary mispricing by the market, and managers are right to
56E.g., Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Daniel and Titman (1997), Fama and French (1993), Liu,
Nissim, and Thomas (2002), and Martin and Wagner (2018).
37
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
use the CAPM. An alternative view is that the market is efficient and the CAPM fails to explain expected
returns, even in the long run. According to that view, our findings reflect valuation mistakes by bidders
and sellers, and managers should not use the CAPM. While it is difficult to empirically distinguish the two
alternatives, our analyses provide some suggestive evidence that managers should not use the CAPM (at
least not in its simple, text-book form and in an M&A context).
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Figure 1: Model Calibration
This figure shows the model-implied coefficients from a regression of CARBiddert on indicator variables for different ranges of target
asset betas (βA), relative to the base case of βA = 0.9, for different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML. The different
model parameters are chosen to match the average values of the corresponding proxy variables in our sample of bids made by
public bidders for private targets between 1977 and 2015. We consider three different degrees of steepness of the empirical SML:
γ = 0 (blue dashed line), γ = 0.5 (blue solid line), and γ = 1 (gray dashed line). The figure also shows the OLS coefficient
estimates of indicator variables for different ranges of βA (relative to the base case of βA = 0.9, the average asset beta of the private
targets in the sample) as reported in Table A.3 in Appendix II (red solid line).
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Figure 2: Private vs. Public Targets
This figure shows the OLS coefficient estimates of indicator variables for different ranges of βA (relative to the base case of
βA = 0.9, the average asset beta of the private targets in the sample) for the sample of private targets (left panel) and the sample of
public targets (right panel) as reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 5. The sample period is 1977 to 2015.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our sample of bids for private (Panel A) and public (Panel B) targets between 1977 and 2015. Bidder CAR is the bidder’s cumulative
abnormal return around the bid announcement. Target (Bidder) Asset Beta is the target’s (bidder’s) asset beta. Beta Spread is the difference between the target’s and bidder’s asset
beta. Deal Value is the value of the bid (in $M). 100% Stock is an indicator for all-stock offers. Avg. Discount Rate is the midpoint between the maximum and minimum discount rate
used in M&A fairness opinions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I.
Panel A – Private Targets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Bids for Private Targets with a CPI-Adjusted Deal Value ≥ $50M, 1977-2015
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Bidder CAR 14,744 2.0% 8.2% -20.5% -2.3% 1.1% 5.6% 27.9%
Target Asset Beta 17,885 0.86 0.33 0.17 0.62 0.86 1.11 1.55
Bidder Asset Beta 18,163 0.87 0.32 0.20 0.64 0.84 1.11 1.54
Beta Spread 17,707 -0.01 0.25 -0.74 -0.06 0.00 0.03 0.76
Deal Value (Log) 18,485 4.91 1.07 3.29 4.09 4.70 5.52 9.08
Deal Value (in $M) 18,485 297 699 27 60 110 250 8,799
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) 18,485 388 882 51 82 148 334 11,437
100% Stock 18,482 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
Avg. Discount Rate 117 14.1% 4.9% 7.0% 11.0% 13.0% 15.0% 30.0%
Panel B – Public Targets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Bids for Public Targets with a CPI-Adjusted Deal Value ≥ $50M, 1977-2015
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Bidder CAR 7,296 -0.6% 7.7% -20.5% -4.6% -0.7% 3.1% 27.9%
Target Asset Beta 7,879 0.82 0.36 0.17 0.53 0.82 1.11 1.55
Bidder Asset Beta 7,932 0.81 0.34 0.20 0.55 0.80 1.09 1.54
Beta Spread 7,794 0.01 0.21 -0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76
Deal Value (Log) 8,095 5.59 1.49 3.29 4.38 5.33 6.55 9.08
Deal Value (in $M) 8,095 921 1,852 27 80 206 699 8,799
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) 8,095 1,258 2,430 51 121 307 1,019 11,437
100% Stock 8,091 0.33 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
Avg. Discount Rate 1,064 13.1% 3.9% 7.0% 10.5% 12.3% 14.5% 30.0%
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Table 2: Bidder Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Bid Announcements
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. Target (Bidder) Controls is a vector of target (bidder) characteristics: Market-to-Book, ROA, Cash Flow
to Assets, Debt to Assets, and Cash to Assets. For private targets, these variables are average values of the corresponding variables
across all public firms in Compustat with the same three-digit primary SIC code. All other variables are defined as in Table 1.
Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are
reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 1.02*** 1.34*** 1.73*** 1.49*** 2.55***
(3.02) (4.20) (4.72) (4.14) (5.06)
Beta Spread -1.36***
(-2.60)
Deal Value (Log) 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(7.37) (7.34) (6.82) (6.69)
Equity 0.59** 0.60** 0.57* 0.51*
(2.24) (2.26) (1.87) (1.69)
Cash 0.30 0.28 0.48 0.44
(1.07) (0.98) (1.45) (1.34)
Toehold -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10
(-0.20) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.24)
Hostile -2.26** -2.44** -2.82** -3.22***
(-2.19) (-2.26) (-2.26) (-2.76)
Same Industry 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.14
(0.65) (0.71) (0.82) (0.96)
Crossborder -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 -0.09
(-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.26) (-0.37)
Poison -0.60 -0.66 -0.51 -0.47
(-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.49) (-0.45)
Tender -0.30 -0.36 -0.57 -0.72
(-0.29) (-0.34) (-0.49) (-0.63)
Multiple Bidders -0.40 -0.38 0.07 0.03
(-0.54) (-0.51) (0.09) (0.04)
Relative Size -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(-7.25) (-7.20) (-7.51) (-7.59)
Bidder Size (Log) -0.94*** -0.94*** -0.96*** -0.96***
(-12.40) (-12.33) (-12.50) (-12.56)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,916 13,599 13,486 12,209 12,109
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Table 3: Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable Estimation
This table presents 2SLS estimates of the sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta. The sample period is 1980 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Deal Controls
is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender,
Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A – 1st Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5.a) (5.b)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Target Target Target Target Target Beta
Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Spread
Target Noise Beta 3.35*** 3.32*** 2.06*** 2.06*** 2.09*** 2.22***
(10.38) (10.74) (14.44) (14.22) (13.61) (12.14)
Bidder Noise Beta -0.10 -2.45***
(-0.67) (-11.63)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,360 13,062 12,953 11,720 11,719 11,719
Panel B – 2nd Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta (Instrumented) 2.09** 2.27*** 3.60** 3.38** 4.70*
(2.26) (2.55) (2.25) (1.98) (1.77)
Beta Spread (Instrumented) -1.92
(-0.92)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,360 13,062 12,953 11,720 11,719
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Variation
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta as function of cross-sectional characteristics. The
sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Target Growth High is an indicator equal to one if the
compound annual growth rate of aggregate sales in the target’s (SIC3-) industry during the three years preceding the takeover bid
is larger than the sample median. Target Relative Size High is an indicator equal to one if Relative Size is larger than the sample
median. Bidder Mentions CAPM is an indicator equal to one if the bidder’s 10K, 10Q, or 8K filings of the three years prior to the
bid announcement contain the words “CAPM” or “Capital Asset Pricing Model.” Listed Peer Available is an indicator equal to one
if, at the time of the acquisition, there is at least one U.S. listed firm in the target’s (SIC3-) industry whose market capitalization is
larger than 50% but smaller than 150% of the target’s equity value as reported in SDC. Steep Empirical SML is an indicator equal to
one if the slope of the empirical SML during the month of the bid announcement is larger than the sample median. Deal Controls is
a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold,
Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables
are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. (Interacted) indicates that all control variables and fixed
effects are interacted with the cross-sectional characteristic of interest, allowing their coefficients to depend on the value of Target
Growth High, Target Relative Size High, Bidder Mentions CAPM, Listed Peer Available, and Steep Empirical SML. t-statistics
based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta × Target Growth High 2.71**
(2.08)
Target Asset Beta × Target Relative Size High 2.86**
(2.31)
Target Asset Beta × Bidder Mentions CAPM 10.95**
(2.03)
Target Asset Beta × Listed Peer Available -2.63**
(-1.99)
Target Asset Beta × Steep Empirical SML -2.03*
(-1.70)
Target Asset Beta 1.44* 1.39** 2.37*** 4.11*** 3.43***
(1.93) (2.07) (4.24) (4.10) (3.80)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,518 11,503 12,109 10,716 10,823
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Table 5: Private vs. Public Targets
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Public Target
is an indicator for public targets. 1 {Target Asset Beta < p25(> p75)} is an indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is
in the bottom (top) quartile of the distribution of asset betas in the sample. 1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} is an indicator equal
to one if the target’s asset beta is larger than a but smaller than (or equal to) b. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-
level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry,
Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table
2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. (Interacted) indicates that all control variables and fixed effects are interacted
with the indicator Public Target, allowing their coefficients vary with the listing status of the target. t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Private Targets Public Targets All Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 2.55*** 0.40 1.57*** 2.55***
(5.06) (0.32) (3.34) (5.00)
Target Asset Beta × Public Target -2.15*
(-1.75)
Public Target -2.84***
(-12.20)
1 {Target Asset Beta < p25} -0.59** -1.20**
(-2.09) (-2.36)
1 {Target Asset Beta > p75} 0.88*** -0.04
(3.27) (-0.07)
1 {−∞ < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.25} -2.25*** -1.75*
(-4.19) (-1.88)
1 {0.25 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.48} -1.16*** -1.74***
(-3.27) (-2.69)
1 {0.48 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.71} -0.50* -0.52
(-1.88) (-0.94)
1 {0.94 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.17} 0.54* -0.72
(1.91) (-1.32)
1 {1.17 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.40} 1.22*** 0.00
(3.53) (0.00)
1 {1.40 < Target Asset Beta <∞} 1.29*** -1.10
(3.04) (-0.89)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Public Target (Interacted) No No No No No No No Yes
Observations 12,109 12,109 12,109 3,894 3,894 3,894 16,547 16,003
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Table 6: Probability of Receiving Takeover Bids
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of public firms’ propensity to receive a controlling takeover bid (Controlling
Bid) or any bid (Any Bid) to the firms’ asset beta. All reported coefficient estimates have been multiplied with 100 to improve
readability. The sample period is 1981 to 2015. All public firms in Compustat are included. Detailed definitions of all variables
are provided in Appendix I. Year × IPO Cohort fixed effects are based on the year of the observation and the IPO cohort of the
firm, defined by the number of years since the firm’s first appearance in CRSP. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the
firms’ (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and
***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: Controlling Bid Any Bid
Asset Beta -1.30* -1.26** -1.47** -1.39**
(-1.78) (-2.18) (-2.06) (-2.18)
Assets (Log) 0.09** 0.33***
(2.11) (4.96)
ROA -6.57*** -11.05***
(-2.70) (-3.61)
Debt to Assets 0.11 2.49***
(0.24) (3.97)
Cash to Assets 0.39 1.49
(0.43) (1.54)
Cash Flow to Assets 6.22** 9.91***
(2.48) (3.20)
Tobin’s Q -0.32*** -0.39***
(-6.82) (-7.19)
PPE to Assets -1.62*** -2.09***
(-2.83) (-3.02)
IO Block 1.37*** 1.89***
(7.57) (8.43)
Year × IPO Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 154,788 139,517 154,788 139,517
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Table 7: Method of Payment
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer an all-stock payment to the bidder’s asset beta (Bidder
Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. 100% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the proposed payment is 100% stock.
All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: 100% Stock
Bidder Asset Beta 9.50*** 13.58*** 8.20*** 7.95*** 8.26***
(4.01) (6.60) (5.23) (4.65) (4.61)
Target Asset Beta -1.22
(-0.53)
Deal Value (Log) 3.41*** 3.47*** 3.47*** 3.49***
(7.00) (7.04) (7.05) (7.10)
Toehold -7.11*** -6.22*** -6.38*** -6.41***
(-2.93) (-2.64) (-2.67) (-2.69)
Hostile -7.57*** -8.48*** -8.84*** -8.75***
(-3.99) (-3.65) (-3.79) (-3.75)
Same Industry 0.39 0.09 0.04 -0.02
(0.30) (0.11) (0.04) (-0.02)
Crossborder -5.55*** -5.45*** -5.33*** -5.15***
(-5.47) (-5.58) (-5.58) (-5.59)
Poison 15.91*** 16.16*** 16.18*** 15.94***
(8.71) (8.81) (9.10) (9.23)
Tender -16.92*** -16.05*** -15.75*** -15.81***
(-10.28) (-10.52) (-10.55) (-10.60)
Multiple Bidders -0.37 -0.42 -0.43 -0.39
(-0.28) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.25)
Relative Size -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(-3.57) (-3.00) (-3.13) (-3.17)
Bidder Size (Log) -1.52*** -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.28***
(-4.97) (-4.44) (-4.40) (-4.41)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 25,772 21,063 18,762 18,423 18,348
51
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
Table 8: Discount Rates Used in Fairness Opinions, Bid-Implied Valuations, and Takeover Premiums
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the average discount rate (Avg. Discount Rate) used in fairness opinions on
M&A bids (Panel A) as well as bid-implied target valuations and takeover premiums (Panel B) to the target’s asset beta. The sample
period is 1977 to 2015. Public Target is an indicator for public targets. FV/Sales and FV/EBIT are the ratios of the bid-implied target
values to sales and EBIT. Premium the percentage premium of the bid-implied equity value over the target’s market capitalization
six month prior to the bid. As pre-bid market prices are available only for public targets, Premium is missing for private targets.
Deal Controls comprises Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log) (omitted in column (1) of Panel B), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same
Industry, Crossborder (omitted in columns (2) and (3) of Panel B), Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size
(Log). Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. All other variables are defined as in Table 2. t-statistics based on standard
errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A (1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Avg. Discount Rate Used in Fairness Opinion DCF (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta 3.03*** 3.69*** 3.99***
(5.76) (12.92) (11.19)
Beta Spread -1.81**
(-2.46)
Deal Value (Log) -1.30*** -1.30***
(-8.90) (-9.17)
Public Target -0.88*** -0.94***
(-2.85) (-2.99)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,174 1,174 1,171
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Deal Value (Log) FV/Sales FV/EBIT Premium
Target Asset Beta -0.20*** -2.58*** -8.47*** -0.49***
(-2.63) (-2.72) (-2.66) (-2.51)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,370 4,196 3,116 3,935
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Table 9: Future Realized Free Cash Flows
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of a firm’s realized free cash flows in future periods scaled by total assets
(FCF/Assets) to the firm’s lagged asset beta. All reported coefficient estimates have been multiplied with 100 to improve readability.
The sample period is 1977 to 2015. All public firms in Compustat are included. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in
Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: FCFtAssetst
FCFt+1
Assetst+1
FCFt+2
Assetst+2
FCFt+3
Assetst+3
Asset Betat−1 -0.32 -0.10 -0.34 -0.43
(-0.20) (-0.06) (-0.22) (-0.29)
Market Capitalizationt−1 (Log) 1.06*** 1.29*** 1.45*** 1.47***
(4.42) (4.94) (5.87) (6.16)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.34*** -0.29***
(-6.22) (-5.58) (-4.81) (-3.66)
Cash to Assetst−1 -17.14*** -16.07*** -15.04*** -14.30***
(-6.50) (-4.65) (-3.88) (-3.50)
Debt to Assetst−1 5.18*** 4.67*** 3.80** 3.28**
(3.22) (2.78) (2.21) (1.98)
ROAt−1 -4.84 4.09 2.81 7.43
(-0.51) (0.41) (0.36) (0.89)
Cash Flow to Assetst−1 36.21*** 24.57** 22.96*** 15.86*
(3.54) (2.33) (2.83) (1.88)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 208,399 187,045 168,898 152,541
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Table 10: Combined CARs of Bidders and Targets
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the combined cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder’s and target’s stock
during the seven-day window around the bid announcement (Combined CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is 1977
to 2015. Only public targets are included. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to
(4) of Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders,
Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I.
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Combined CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta -0.60 -0.85 -0.76 0.21
(-1.07) (-1.29) (-1.04) (0.18)
Beta Spread -1.29
(-1.17)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 5,079 4,261 3,992 3,949
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Table 11: Bidder Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR)
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder’s stock over different event windows (Bidder BHAR) to the target’s asset beta.
[x,y] denotes an event window from t = x to t = y for a bid announced on date t = 0. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Deal Controls
is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison,
Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on
standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder BHAR (in Percentage Points)
Event Window: [-3,+3] [+4,+100] [+4,+200] [+4,+300] [+4,+400] [-3,+100] [-3,+200] [-3,+300] [-3,+400]
Target Asset Beta 2.75*** 0.42 2.82 4.50 6.47 3.63* 6.21** 7.49* 8.95*
(4.29) (0.22) (0.96) (1.09) (1.35) (1.75) (2.08) (1.88) (1.88)
Bidder SDC Ind. × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,281 10,220 10,038 9,817 9,578 10,219 10,037 9,816 9,577
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Table 12: Variation in Corporate Governance and Managerial Entrenchment
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta as function of the bidder’s corporate governance and
managerial entrenchment. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for private targets are included. Institutional Ownership
is the percentage of outstanding shares of the bidder that are owned by institutional investors. Insider Ownership is the percentage
of outstanding shares of the bidder that are owned by the five highest paid executives of the bidder. Wealth Performance Sensitivity
is the performance sensitivity measure of Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) for the bidder’s CEO. Board Independence is the
percentage of independent directors on the bidder’s board. Anti Takeover Index is the anti takeover index of Bebchuk, Cohen,
and Ferell (2004) for the bidder. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2:
Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders,
Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I.
(Interacted) indicates that all control variables and fixed effects are interacted with the governance or entrenchment characteristic
of interest. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta × Institutional Ownership -7.46***
(-2.56)
Target Asset Beta × Insider Ownership -3.30
(-1.25)
Target Asset Beta ×Wealth-Performance Sensitivity -0.02**
(-2.25)
Target Asset Beta × Board Independence -1.92
(-1.05)
Target Asset Beta × Anti-Takeover Index 1.07**
(1.96)
Target Asset Beta 7.51*** 2.88* 2.46*** 2.96** -1.66
(3.70) (1.93) (3.56) (2.09) (-0.97)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls (Interacted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,784 1,942 7,017 4,467 5,561
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Appendix to
“CAPM-Based Company (Mis)valuations”
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Appendix I – Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Above 50% Stock Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment consists of more than 50% stock.
Anti Takeover Index Anti takeover index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferell (2004).
Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit
primary SIC code. Asset betas are computed as βA = βE/ [1 + (1− τ)×D/E], where βE
is the equity beta, τ is the statutory tax rate in the highest bracket, D is total debt (dltt+ dlc),
andE is the market value of equity. Using alternative methodologies to delever the equity betas
does not materially affect the results. Equity betas are estimated by regressing five years of
monthly excess returns (ret minus the risk-free rate obtained from Kenneth French’s webpage,
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html) on excess returns of
the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (including dividends). We use CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11
and compute the value-weighted average beta in case of multiple securities per firm. We drop
estimates based on less than 36 months of return data. Further, we drop observations for which
the estimated beta is negative, and we drop the same number of observations in the right tail of
the distribution of estimated betas.
Assets (Log) Natural logarithm of the book value of assets in USD million.
Beta Spread Target Asset Beta minus Bidder Asset Beta.
Beta Spread (Equity) Target Equity Beta minus Bidder Equity Beta.
Bidder Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit
primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid announcement. (See
Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder BHAR Buy-and-hold abnormal return of the bidder’s stock. [x,y] denotes an event window from t = x
to t = y for a bid announced on date t = 0. The buy-and-hold abnormal return for bidder i is
given by BHARi ≡ BHi − BHMatchi , where BHi is the buy-and-hold return of bidder i (during
the event window from t = x to t = y), and BHMatchi is the buy-and-hold return on a portfolio
of firms matched to bidder i based on industry, size, and Tobin’s Q (e.g., Savor and Lu, 2009).
We first match bidder i to all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit primary SIC
code. Next, we compute the Mahalanobis distance to all matched firms in terms of size and
Tobin’s Q to identify the ten closest industry peers. BHMatchi is then computed as the weighted
average buy-and-hold return of these ten closest industry peers, where the weights are chosen
such that closer peers receive greater weight. If there are less than ten peers (because there are
not enough firms in the same industry), the matched portfolio contains less than ten firms. The
weight assigned to peer j of bidder i is wi,j = K (di,j/hi) /
∑Ni
k=1 K (di,k/hi), where Ni is
the number of peers matched to bidder i, di,j is the Mahalanobis distance between bidder i and
peer j, K (·) is the Gaussian density function, and hi is equal to the Mahalanobis distance to
the nearest matched peer (see, e.g., Todd, 1999).
Bidder CAR Cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock over the seven-day window around the bid
announcement (i.e., from t = −3 to t = +3 for a bid announced on date t = 0). Abnormal
returns are market adjusted returns of CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11, using the CRSP value-
weighted portfolio as the market proxy. Outliers are dropped by trimming the final distribution
of CARs at the 0.5% level in each tail.
Bidder Equity Beta Equally weighted average equity beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-digit
primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid announcement. (See
Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder Mentions CAPM Indicator equal to one if the bidder’s 10K, 10Q, or 8K filings of the three years prior to the bid
announcement contain the words “CAPM” or “Capital Asset Pricing Model.”
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Variable Definition
Bidder Noise Beta Equally weighted average noise beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the bidder, estimated one month prior to the bid announce-
ment. (See Noise Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Bidder Size (Log) Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the bidder in USD million four days
prior to the bid announcement.
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors on the board.
Cash Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment includes cash.
Cash Flow to Assets Net income (ib) + D&A (dp) / total assets (at).
Cash to Assets Total cash and cash equivalents (che) / total assets (at).
Combined CAR Weighted average of the cumulative abnormal returns of the bidder’s and target’s
stock over the seven-day window around the bid announcement. (See Bidder CAR
for details of the estimation of the cumulative abnormal returns.)
Crossborder Indicator equal to one if the target’s and bidder’s headquarters are located in different
countries.
Deal Value (Log) Natural logarithm of the value of the takeover bid in USD million.
Deal Value (in $M) Value of the takeover bid in USD million.
Deal Value (in $M, CPI-Adjusted) Inflation-adjusted value of the takeover bid in USD million (in December 2015
terms).
Debt to Assets Total debt (dlc + dltt) / total assets (at).
Equity Indicator equal to one if the proposed payment includes stock.
FCF/Assets [EBIT× (1− τ) + D&A− CAPEX−∆NWC] /ASSETS, where EBIT is earnings
before interest and taxes (Compustat item ebit, or oiadp if ebit is missing, or pi +
xint − spi − nopi if both ebit and oiadp are missing), τ is the statutory tax rate in the
highest bracket, D&A is depreciation and amortization (Compustat item dp, or xdp if
dp is missing, or dpc if both dp and xdp are missing), CAPEX is capital expenditures
(Compustat item capx, or capxv if capx is missing), ∆NWC is the increase in net
working capital (Compustat items recch + invch + apalch + aoloch, or if missing: −
(rect − rectt−1) − (invt − invtt−1 ) + ( ap − apt−1) − (aco − lco − acot−1 +
lcot−1)), and ASSETS is the book value of total assets (Compustat item at).
FV Bid-implied firm value of the target, defined as EV+ASSETS−BVE. EV is the bid-
implied equity value of the target, defined as the equity value indicated in SDC, or the
deal value divided by the percentage of equity acquired if the equity value is missing
but the deal is completed, or the deal value divided by the percentage of equity sought
if the equity value is missing and the deal is withdrawn. ASSETS is the book value
of total assets (Compustat item at), and BVE is the book value of equity (Compustat
item ceq).
FV/EBIT Bid-implied firm value of the target divided by the target’s EBIT.
FV/Sales Bid-implied firm value of the target divided by the target’s sales.
HMFFS Dollar amount of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales, assuming that each position in
an affected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its portfolio weight, scaled
by the dollar volume of trading in the stock.
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Variable Definition
HMFFS∗ Variant of HMFFS where the dollar amount of trading used to scale the dollar amount of
hypothetical fire sales is computed using the share price at the beginning of the quarter.
HMFFS∗∗ Number of shares sold in hypothetical mutual fund fire sales, assuming that each position
in an affected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its portfolio weight.
HMFFS∗∗∗ Dollar value of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales, assuming that each position in an af-
fected fund’s portfolio is liquidated in proportion to its portfolio weight.
Hostile Indicator equal to one if the initial bid is hostile.
Insider Ownership Percentage of outstanding shares of the bidder that are owned by the five highest paid exec-
utives of the bidder.
Institutional Ownership Percentage of outstanding shares of the bidder that are owned by institutional investors.
IO Block Indicator equal to one if an institutional investor owns more than 5% of the firm’s outstand-
ing shares.
Listed Peer Available Indicator equal to one if the target is a U.S. firm and, at the time of the acquisition, there
is at least one other publicly listed U.S. firm with the same primary three-digit SIC code
whose market capitalization is neither smaller than 50% nor larger than 150% of the target’s
bid-implied equity value reported in SDC.
Market Capitalization (Log) Natural logarithm of the market value of equity in USD million.
Market-to-Book Market capitalization (prc × csho) / shareholders’ equity (ceq).
Multiple Bidders Indicator equal to one if there is more than one bidder.
Noise Beta In-sample covariance between the estimated noise component in a firm’s realized excess
stock returns and the realized excess returns on the market proxy, scaled by the in-sample
variance of the excess market returns. The noise components are estimated as the fitted
values from a regression of realized excess returns on hypothetical mutual fund fire sales.
Individual firms’ noise betas are delevered and aggregated at the industry level in analogy
to the construction of Asset Beta.
Poison Indicator equal to one if the target uses a defense mechanism.
PPE to Assets Property, plant, and equipment (ppent) / total assets (at).
Predicted WACC Weighted average cost of capital implied by Target Asset Beta and the same assumptions as
in the model calibration in Section 4.3.
Premium Percentage premium of the bid-implied equity value over the target’s market capitalization
six months prior to the bid.
Public Target Indicator equal to one if the target is listed.
Relative Size Deal value divided by the market capitalization of the bidder four days prior to the bid
announcement.
Repurchase Indicator equal to one if a firm repurchases shares.
ROA Return on assets (ib / at).
Same Industry Indicator equal to one if the bidder and target operate in the same industry as defined by the
first three digits of their primary SIC codes.
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Variable Definition
SEO Indicator equal to one if a firm does a seasoned equity offering.
Steep Empirical SML Indicator equal to one if the slope of the empirical SML (estimated following Hong
and Sraer, 2016) during the month of the bid announcement is larger than the sample
median.
Stock vs. Cash Indicator equal to one (zero) if 100% of the proposed payment is in stock (cash). Deals
for which the proposed payment comprises both stock and cash are excluded.
Target Asset Beta Equally weighted average asset beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month prior to the bid announcement.
(See Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Target Equity Beta Equally weighted average equity beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month prior to the bid announcement.
(See Asset Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Target Growth High Indicator equal to one if the compound annual growth rate of aggregate sales in the
target’s (SIC3-) industry during the three years preceding the takeover bid is larger than
the sample median.
Target Noise Beta Equally weighted average noise beta of all public firms in CRSP with the same three-
digit primary SIC code as the target, estimated one month prior to the bid announcement.
(See Noise Beta for details of the estimation of individual betas.)
Target Relative Size High Indicator equal to one if Relative Size is larger than the sample median.
Tender Indicator equal to one if the bid is a tender offer.
Tobin’s Q [Assets (at) + market capitalization (prc × csho) − equity (ceq)] / assets (at).
Toehold Fraction of the target’s equity held by the bidder before the bid.
Avg. Discount Rate Average of the maximum and minimum discount rate (SDC items FO DCF RATE HI
and FO DCF RATE LOW) used for discounted cash flow analyses in M&A fairness
opinions.
100% Stock Indicator equal to one if 100% of the offered payment is in stock.
Wealth Performance Sensitivity Performance sensitivity measure of Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009).
1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is larger than a but smaller than (or equal
to) b.
1 {Target Asset Beta < p25} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is in the bottom quartile of the distribution.
1 {Target Asset Beta > p75} Indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is in the top quartile of the distribution.
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Appendix II – Robustness Tests
Figure A.1: Non-Parametric Regression of Target Asset Beta on Target Noise Beta
This figure shows the coefficient estimates from an OLS regression of Target Asset Beta on indicator variables for different ranges
of Target Noise Beta. The sample period is 1980 to 2015.
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Ta
rg
et
 A
ss
et
 B
et
a
-.15 -.1 -.05 0 .05 .1 .15
Target Noise Beta
90% confidence interval
62
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
Table A.1: Alternative CAR Models
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. In column (1), Bidder CAR is defined as the return of the bidder’s stock minus the return of the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio. In column (2), Bidder CAR is defined as the return of the bidder’s stock minus the expected return implied
by the CAPM. In columns (3) and (4), Bidder CAR is defined as the return of the bidder’s stock minus the expected return implied
by the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 1993) and Carhart four factor model (Carhart, 1997), respectively. Deal
Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity,
Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All
other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
CAR Model: Market Adjusted Market Model 3 Factors 4 Factors
Target Asset Beta 2.55*** 2.19*** 2.13*** 2.23***
(5.06) (4.61) (4.43) (4.66)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,109 12,061 12,061 12,060
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Table A.2: Sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s equity beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. Target Equity Beta is the equity beta of the target. Beta Spread (Equity) is the difference between the
target’s and the bidder’s equity beta. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of
Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative
Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics
based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Equity Beta 1.41*** 1.64*** 1.37*** 2.16***
(4.95) (5.24) (4.38) (4.69)
Beta Spread (Equity) -1.06**
(-2.27)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,610 13,490 12,211 12,112
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Table A.3: Non-Parametric Estimation of the Sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock during the seven-day
window around the bid announcement (Bidder CAR) to the target’s asset beta. The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. 1 {a < Target Asset Beta ≤ b} is an indicator equal to one if the target’s asset beta is larger than a but
smaller than (or equal to) b. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in column (5) of Table 2: Beta
Spread, Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative
Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics
based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
1 {−∞ < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.20} -2.66***
(-2.83)
1 {0.20 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.32} -1.67***
(-2.87)
1 {0.32 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.44} -0.88*
(-1.74)
1 {0.44 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.56} -0.58
(-1.47)
1 {0.56 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.68} -0.30
(-0.88)
1 {0.68 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 0.80} -0.13
(-0.44)
1 {0.92 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.04} 0.55*
(1.68)
1 {1.04 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.16} 0.39
(1.00)
1 {1.16 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.28} 1.21***
(2.64)
1 {1.28 < Target Asset Beta ≤ 1.40} 1.21***
(2.66)
1 {1.40 < Target Asset Beta <∞} 1.25***
(2.84)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes
Deal Controls Yes
Target Controls Yes
Bidder Controls Yes
Observations 12,109
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics – Public Firms in Compustat (Bid Probability Sample)
This table presents descriptive statistics for all public firms in Compustat considered when estimating the sensitivity of public firms’ propensity to receive takeover bids to the firms’
asset beta (Table 6). The sample period is 1981 to 2015. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Variable: Observations Mean SD Min. p25 p50 p75 Max.
Controlling Bid 154,831 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 0 1
Any Bid 154,831 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
Asset Beta 154,831 0.85 0.34 0.17 0.60 0.86 1.11 1.55
Assets (Log) 152,023 5.27 2.31 -2.06 3.59 5.21 6.87 10.76
ROA 151,848 -0.07 0.42 -9.03 -0.03 0.02 0.06 0.30
Debt to Assets 150,928 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.35 4.15
Cash to Assets 151,567 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.95
Cash Flow to Assets 147,434 -0.02 0.42 -9.30 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.37
Tobin’s Q 151,898 1.95 2.47 0.54 1.02 1.29 1.99 62.40
PPE to Assets 150,803 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.38 0.91
IO Block 147,780 0.61 0.49 0 0 1 1 1
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Table A.5: Alternative Method of Payment Definitions
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer different types of payment to the bidder’s asset beta
(Bidder Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. Equity is an indicator equal to one if the proposed payment includes
stock. Above 50% Stock is an indicator equal to one if the proposed payment consists of more than 50% stock. Stock vs. Cash is an
indicator equal to one if 100% of the proposed payment is in stock and zero if 100% of the proposed payment is in cash. Deals for
which the proposed payment comprises both stock and cash are excluded from column (3). Deal Controls is a vector comprising
all deal-level controls included in column (2) to (4) of Table 7: Deal Value (Log), Toehold, Hostile, Same Industry, Crossborder,
Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 7. Detailed
definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-) industry are reported
in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Equity Above 50% Stock Stock vs. Cash
Bidder Asset Beta 10.18*** 8.50*** 10.78***
(4.81) (4.73) (5.41)
Target Asset Beta -0.19 -0.95 -0.86
(-0.06) (-0.31) (-0.28)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,348 17,631 13,237
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Table A.6: Method of Payment and Target Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to offer an all-stock payment to the bidder’s equity beta. The
sample period is 1977 to 2015. Bidder (Target) Equity Beta are the bidder’s and target’s equity beta, respectively. Deal Controls
is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table 7: Deal Value (Log), Toehold, Hostile, Same
Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as
in Table 7. Detailed definitions are provided in Appendix I. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the bidder’s (SIC3-)
industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: 100% Stock
Bidder Equity Beta 7.61*** 7.62*** 5.54*** 5.52***
(3.86) (3.90) (3.54) (3.47)
Target Equity Beta 0.01
(0.00)
Target SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 21,082 20,471 18,428 18,354
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Appendix III – Model Extensions and Derivations
Model Extension: Relaxing Assumptions (AI) and (AII)
We consider a bidder that seeks to acquire a fraction pi ∈ (0, 1] of a private firm’s equity. If acquired, the
value of the equity stake as assessed by the bidder and seller is57
piEt = pi ×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt + St(pi)
]
. (A1)
In exchange for the fraction pi ∈ (0, 1] of the target’s equity, the bidder offers an amountBt. The seller’s
outside option is to reject the bidder’s offer and retain an equity stake valued at
V At + ∆t −Dt. (A2)
Alternatively, the seller can accept the offer and retain an equity stake valued at
(1− pi)× [V At + ∆t −Dt + St(pi)] . (A3)
The Nash bargaining solution implies that the bidder’s offer must satisfy
V At + ∆t −Dt + αSt(pi) = (1− pi)×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt + St(pi)
]
+Bt (A4)
⇔
Bt = pi ×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt
]
+ αSt(pi)− (1− pi)× St(pi). (A5)
The bid corresponds to the stand-alone value of the equity stake, plus a fraction α of the synergies, minus
the increase in value of the seller’s remaining equity stake that is due to the synergies.58
57We allow the value of the synergies to depend on the fraction of equity acquired by the bidder to capture the notion that the
size of the stake may affect the bidder’s ability and incentives to unlock synergies.
58The derivation assumes that the bidder does not have a toehold in the target when making the bid. If the bidder has a toehold
ω ∈ (0, 1), then the seller must decide between rejecting the bid and retaining a stake valued at (1− ω) × [V At + ∆t −Dt] or
accepting the bid and retaining a stake valued at (1− pi − ω) × [V At + ∆t −Dt + St(pi)]. In that case, the bidder’s offer must
satisfy Bt = pi ×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt
]
+ αSt(pi)− (1− pi − ω)× St(pi).
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The cumulative abnormal return of the bidder’s stock in response to the bid announcement is given by
CARBiddert =
piE˜t −Bt
EBiddert
, (A6)
where
piE˜t = pi ×
[
V˜ At + ∆˜t − D˜t + S˜t(pi)
]
(A7)
is the value of the equity stake (conditional on its acquisition by the bidder) as assessed by the market, and
EBiddert is the bidder’s market capitalization. Equations (A5) and (A7) can be written as
Bt = pi
∞∑
τ=t+1
[
FCFτ
(1 + rA)
τ−t +
δτ
(1 + r∆)
τ−t −
dτ
(1 + rD)
τ−t
]
− (1− pi − α)
∞∑
τ=t+1
sτ (pi)
(1 + rS)
τ−t (A8)
and
piE˜t = pi
∞∑
τ=t+1
[
FCFτ
(1 + r˜A)
τ−t +
δτ
(1 + r˜∆)
τ−t −
dτ
(1 + r˜D)
τ−t
]
+ pi
∞∑
τ=t+1
sτ (pi)
(1 + r˜S)
τ−t . (A9)
The appropriate discount rates as assessed by the bidder and market are given by
ri = rf + βi × µ for i ∈ {A,∆, D, S} (A10)
and
r˜A = rf +
[
γ × βA + (1− γ)× βA
]× µ, (A11)
where rf is the risk-free rate, µ the market risk premium, and βA the average asset beta in the economy.
59
That is, we assume that the empirical SML has a slope of γ × µ for some γ ∈ [0, 1] and crosses the CAPM-
implied SML at the average asset beta (βA).
We assume that the systematic risk of the net benefits of leverage, debt, and synergies is weakly increas-
ing in the systematic risk of the target’s operating free cash flows on a stand-alone basis, i.e.,
∂βi
∂βA
≥ 0 and ∂β˜i
∂βA
≥ 0 for i ∈ {∆, D, S} . (A12)
59If the portfolio of all assets in the economy constitutes the true (CAPM-)market portfolio, then the average asset beta is equal
to one (by construction). Note, however, that our predictions do not depend on βA = 1, so we do not impose this condition.
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We further assume
∂
∂βA
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)
< 0, (A13)
which rules out that an increase in the systematic risk of the operating free cash flows increases the stand-
alone value of the target’s equity (all else equal), and
α+ pi ≥ 1, (A14)
which implies that the bid is at least equal to the stand-alone value of the acquired stake, i.e.,
Bt ≥ pi ×
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)
. (A15)
This would be the case, for example, if any synergies are split evenly between the bidder and the seller
(α = 0.5) but can only be achieved if the bidder acquires a majority stake (pi > 0.5).
Given the above assumptions, we have
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
= − 1
EBiddert
×
[
pi × ∂
∂βA
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)− (1− pi − α) ∂St
∂βA
]
> 0 if γ = 0, (A16)
and
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
1− α
EBiddert
× ∂St
∂βA
≤ 0 if γ = 1. (A17)
Continuity in γ thus implies that a γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists, such that
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
> 0 for γ < γ∗. (A18)
That is, the bidder’s cumulative abnormal return
(
CARBiddert
)
around the bid announcement is increasing in
the target’s asset beta (βA) as long as the empirical SML is not too steep (γ < γ∗ < 1).
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Model Extension: Public Target
We assume that the key difference compared to a private target is that the seller of a public target can sell the
shares at the prevailing market price Êt instead of selling them to the bidder at price Bt.60 Consequently,
the seller’s outside option when negotiating with the bidder depends on the target’s current market price Êt.
Specifically, if the target’s stand-alone value as assessed by the bidder and seller is higher than the
current market price (V At + ∆t −Dt ≥ Êt), then bilateral Nash bargaining implies
Bt = V
A
t + ∆t −Dt + αSt, (A19)
which in turn implies61
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
µ
EBiddert
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t)× FCFτ
(1 + rf + βA × µ)τ−t+1
> 0. (A20)
If, instead, the market price is higher than the stand-alone value but lower than the value including synergies
(V At + ∆t −Dt < Êt ≤ V At + ∆t −Dt + St), then the bidder pays
Bt = (1− α)× Êt + α×
(
V At + ∆t −Dt + St
)
, (A21)
and we have
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
= α× µ
EBiddert
∞∑
τ=t+1
(τ − t)× FCFτ
(1 + rf + βA × µ)τ−t+1
> 0. (A22)
If the target’s current market price exceeds the equity value including synergies as assessed by the bidder
and seller (Êt > V At + ∆t −Dt + St), then no bid is made because the seller’s outside option dominates
any bid that the bidder would be willing to make.
60Note that Êt denotes the market’s assessment of the target’s equity value on a stand-alone basis, whereas E˜t denotes the
market’s assessment of the target’s equity value conditional on an acquisition by the bidder (i.e., including synergies).
61To derive Equation (A20), we assume (AI) and (AII) as in Section 2.
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Derivations of Additional Predictions
Derivation of Predictions 2 and 3: We assume FCFt+1 > 0 and that the expected operating free cash
flows on a stand-alone basis grow at a constant rate g < rA thereafter. This implies
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
µ
EBiddert
× FCFt+1
(rf + βA × µ− g)2
> 0, (A23)
which can be rewritten as
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
µ
rf + βA × µ− g ×
(
R− ∆t −Dt + αSt
EBiddert
)
, (A24)
where R ≡ Bt/EBiddert is the relative size of the bid vis-a`-vis the bidder. We thus have
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂g
=
2µ
EBiddert
× FCFt+1
(rf + βA × µ− g)3
> 0 (A25)
and
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂R
=
µ
rf + βA × µ− g > 0. (A26)
Derivation of Prediction 4: We assume that the bidder’s and seller’s assessment of the target’s equity
value is a weighted average of the CAPM-based value and a market-based (i.e., non-CAPM-based) value,
Et = ω × ECAPM-basedt + (1− ω)× EMarket-basedt , (A27)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on the CAPM-based value. EMarket-basedt could be the current market price for
a public target and a multiple-implied price for a private target (e.g., based on listed peers). Assuming
∂EMarket-basedt
∂βA
>
∂ECAPM-basedt
∂βA
(A28)
(e.g., ∂EMarket-basedt /∂βA = 0) then implies
∂2CARBiddert
∂βA∂ω
> 0. (A29)
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Derivation of Prediction 5: We assume that the empirical SML is given by
r˜i = rf +
[
γ × βi + (1− γ)× βA
]× µ, (A30)
for some γ ∈ [0, 1], and that the bidder seeks to acquire a fraction pi ∈ (0, 1] of the target’s equity. Given
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
= − 1
EBiddert
×
[
pi × ∂
∂βA
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)− (1− pi − α) ∂St
∂βA
]
> 0 if γ = 0, (A31)
and
∂CARBiddert
∂βA
=
1− α
EBiddert
× ∂St
∂βA
≤ 0 if γ = 1, (A32)
continuity in γ implies that two cutoffs γ and γ with 0 < γ ≤ γ < 1 exist such that ∂CARBiddert /∂βA is
larger for all γ < γ than for all γ > γ.
Derivation of Prediction 6: Assuming α < 1, Equations (A20) and (A22) imply that the relation between
a bidder’s CAR and target’s asset beta is weaker for a public than for a private target if the public target’s
stand-alone value as assessed by the bidder and seller
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)
is lower than its current market
price (Êt). This condition is more likely to be satisfied for high than for low beta public targets because
∂
(
V At + ∆t −Dt
)
∂βA
<
∂Êt
∂βA
. (A33)
Further, assuming that the weight given to a public target’s market capitalization in Equation (A27) is greater
than the weight given to a multiple-implied value for a private target (e.g., because the current market price
is considered a more accurate assessment than a multiple-implied value), Prediction 4 also implies that the
relation between bidder CARs and target asset betas is weaker for public than for private targets.
Derivation of the Prediction Regarding the Probability of Receiving a Takeover Bid: We assume that
organizing a takeover costs c > 0 and that the value of synergies as assessed by the bidder and seller is a
random variable with cumulative distribution function F and density function f > 0 for St ∈ R+. To avoid
a mechanical relation between a firm’s asset beta and the probability of receiving a takeover bid, we assume
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that F does not depend on βA.62 Differences in beta thus do not imply differences in potential synergies
(and thus attractiveness as a takeover target) per se.
For a private firm, a bidder makes a bid if the present value of the synergies exceeds the costs of orga-
nizing the takeover (St > c). Hence, the probability of a bid does not depend on the firm’s asset beta:
Pr (Bid) = Pr (St > c) = 1− F (c) . (A34)
For a public firm, a bid is made if the value of the synergies exceeds the costs of organizing the takeover
(St > c) and the firm’s current market price is lower than its equity value including synergies as assessed by
the bidder and seller (Êt < V At + ∆t −Dt + St). The bid probability is therefore
Pr (Bid) = Pr
(
St > max
{
c; Êt − V At −∆t +Dt
})
(A35)
= 1− F
(
max
{
c; Êt − V At −∆t +Dt
})
≤ 1− F (c) , (A36)
Assuming (AI) and (AII) as in Section 2, we further obtain63
∂ Pr (Bid)
∂βA
=

−f
(
Êt − V At −∆t +Dt
)
×µ∑∞τ=t+1 (τ−t)×FCFτ(1+rf+βA×µ)τ−t+1
if c < Êt − V At −∆t +Dt
0 if c > Êt − V At −∆t +Dt,
(A37)
implying that a public firm’s probability of receiving a takeover bid is weakly decreasing in its asset beta.
Derivation of the Prediction Regarding the Average Asset Betas of Private vs. Public Targets: The
derivation of prediction regarding the probability of receiving a takeover bid implies that the expected asset
62As long as the value of the synergies is not increasing in the firm’s asset beta, our prediction would not qualitatively change
even if F depends on βA. In that case, however, the probability 1−F (x) that St exceeds some cutoff x justifying a takeover – and
hence the probability of a bid – would depend on βA even if the empirical SML and the CAPM-implied SML coincide.
63(AI) and (AII) are not necessary (but sufficient) to obtain ∂ Pr (Bid) /∂βA ≤ 0. The (weaker) necessary and sufficient
condition is that an increase in the asset beta entails a smaller reduction in the market’s than the bidder’s assessment of the target’s
equity value on a stand-alone basis, so that ∂
∂βA
(
Êt − V At −∆t +Dt
)
> 0.
75
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3050928 
beta in a sample of private targets is equal to the average asset beta in the population of private firms. The
reason is that each private firm’s probability of receiving a takeover bid is 1 − F (c), irrespective of its
asset beta. It follows that the sample of private targets constitutes a random draw from the population of
private firms. For public firms, instead, the probability of receiving a takeover bid is weakly decreasing in
the asset beta. Consequently, because public firms with a higher asset beta have a weakly lower probability
of receiving a takeover bid, the expected asset beta in a sample of public targets is weakly smaller than the
average asset beta in the population of public firms. Hence, if the average asset beta in the population of
private firms is the same as in the population of public firms, then the expected asset beta in a sample of
private takeover targets is weakly larger than the expected asset beta in a sample of public takeover targets.
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Derivation of Equations (15), (17), and (18)
We build on the model extension introduced at the beginning of this appendix and use a tilde (x˜) to indicate
the market’s beliefs and assessments. L = Dt/Est denotes the target’s book leverage and τ the tax rate. We
assume: (I) The operating cash flows and synergies have the same systematic risk and grow at a constant
rate (g). (II) The level of debt is permanent and the net benefit of leverage is equal to the tax shield. (III)
The bidder, seller, and market use the book value of debt (Dt) as a proxy for the debt’s market value.
Derivation of Equation (15):
CARBiddert ×
EBiddert
ρ
= piE˜t −Bt (A38)
= pi
(
V˜ At + ∆˜t − D˜t + S˜t
)
− pi (V At + ∆t −Dt + St)+ (1− α)St (A39)
= pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
r˜A − g +
δt+1 − dt+1
r˜D
)
− pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g +
δt+1 − dt+1
rD
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A40)
= pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
r˜A − g +
τdt+1 − dt+1
r˜D
)
− pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g +
τdt+1 − dt+1
rD
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A41)
= pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
r˜A − g − (1− τ)
dt+1
r˜D
)
− pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g − (1− τ)
dt+1
rD
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A42)
= pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
r˜A − g − (1− τ) D˜t
)
− pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g − (1− τ)Dt
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A43)
= pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
r˜A − g − (1− τ)Dt
)
− pi
(
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g − (1− τ)Dt
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A44)
= pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)
(
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
)
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g (A45)
⇔
CARBiddert =
ρ
EBiddert
×
{
pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)×
[
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
]
+ (1− α) st+1
rA − g
}
(A46)
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Derivation of Equation (17):
Bt = pi
(
V At + ∆t −Dt + St
)− (1− α)St = pi [V At − (1− τ)Dt + St]− (1− α)St (A47)
with
Dt = L× Est = L×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt
]
=
L
pi
× [Bt + (1− pi − α)St] (A48)
implies
Bt = pi
[
V At − (1− τ)Dt + St
]− (1− α)St (A49)
= pi
(
V At + St
)− (1− τ)L [Bt + (1− pi − α)St]− (1− α)St (A50)
⇔
Bt [1 + (1− τ)L] = pi
(
V At + St
)− St [1− α+ (1− τ)L (1− pi − α)] (A51)
= pi
FCFt+1 + st+1
rA − g −
st+1
rA − g [1− α+ (1− τ)L (1− pi − α)] (A52)
⇔
pi (FCFt+1 + st+1) = Bt [1 + (1− τ)L] (rA − g) + st+1 [1− α+ (1− τ)L (1− pi − α)] (A53)
Derivation of Equation (18):
Bt − B˜t = pi ×
[
V At + ∆t −Dt + St
]− (1− α)St − pi × [V˜ At + ∆˜t − D˜t + S˜t]
+ (1− α) S˜t (A54)
= −pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)×
[
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
]
+ (1− α) st+1 ×
[
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
]
(A55)
= [(1− α) st+1 − pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)]×
[
1
r˜A − g −
1
rA − g
]
(A56)
⇔∣∣∣Bt − B˜t∣∣∣ = |(1− α) st+1 − pi (FCFt+1 + st+1)| × ∣∣∣∣ 1r˜A − g − 1rA − g
∣∣∣∣ (A57)
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Appendix IV – Construction of Hypothetical Mutual Fund Fire Sales
The following description is based on Dessaint, Foucault, Fre´sard, and Matray (2018). For each stock i, we
construct HMFFSi,q,t, a measure of hypothetical sales of stock i during quarter q of year t that are due to
large outflows in mutual funds owning the stock. Our approach follows the three-step approach proposed
by Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012).
First, in each year t, we estimate quarterly mutual fund flows for all U.S. funds that are not specialized
in a given industry using CRSP mutual funds data. For every fund, CRSP reports the monthly return and the
total net assets (TNA) by asset class. The average return of fund j during month m of year t is given by
RETURNj,m,t =
∑
k(TNAk,j,m,t × RETURNk,j,m,t)∑
k TNAk,j,m,t
, (A58)
where k indexes asset classes. We compound monthly fund returns to estimate average quarterly returns and
aggregate TNAs across asset classes in March, June, September, and December to obtain the TNA of fund
j at the end of every quarter in each year.
An estimate of the net inflow experienced by fund j during quarter q of year t is then given by
FLOWj,q,t =
TNAj,q,t − TNAj,q−1,t × (1 + RETURNj,q,t)
TNAj,q−1,t
, (A59)
where TNAj,q,t is the total net asset value of fund j at the end of quarter q of year t, and RETURNj,q,t is the
return of fund j during quarter q of year t. FLOWj,q,t is therefore an estimate of the net inflow experienced
by fund j during quarter q of year t as a percentage of its net asset value at the beginning of the quarter.
Second, we calculate the dollar value of fund’s j holdings of stock i at the end of every quarter using
data from CDA Spectrum/Thomson. CDA Spectrum/Thomson provides the number of stocks held by all
U.S. funds at the end of every quarter. The total value of the participation held by fund j in firm i at the end
of quarter q of year t is
SHARESi,j,q,t × PRCi,q,t, (A60)
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where SHARESj,i,q,t is the number of shares i held by fund j at the end of quarter q of year t, and PRCi,q,t
is the price of stock i at the end of quarter q of year t.
For all mutual funds for which FLOWj,q,t ≤ −0.05, we then compute
HMFFSUSDi,q,t =
∑
j
(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t). (A61)
This variable corresponds to the hypothetical net selling of stock i, in U.S. dollars (USD), by all mutual
funds subject to extreme outflows (i.e., outflows greater or equal to 5%). We also compute the dollar volume
of trading in stock i during quarter q of year t (VOLi,q,t) as64
VOLi,q,t =
∑
m
Shares Tradedi,m,q,t × PRCi,m,q,t (A62)
where Shares Tradedi,m,q,t is the total number of shares i traded during month m in quarter q of year t, and
PRCi,m,q,t is the price of the shares at the end of month m.
Finally, we define the measure of hypothetical mutual fund fire sales (HMFFS) as
HMFFSi,q,t ≡
HMFFSUSDi,q,t
VOLi,q,t
=
∑
j(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t)
VOLi,q,t
. (A63)
64An alternative is to compute the total dollar volume of trading in stock i during quarter q of year t as VOLi,q,t =
Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t × PRCi,q,t. Doing so does not qualitatively change the results.
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Appendix V – Robustness of IV Estimation to Critique by Wardlaw (2018)
Wardlaw (2018) argues that using the dollar volume of trading during quarter q when computing HMFFSi,q,t
may be problematic if HMFFSi,q,t is subsequently used as an instrument for stock i’s return. For example,
using VOLi,q,t = Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t × PRCi,q,t implies
HMFFSi,q,t ≡
∑
j(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t)
VOLi,q,t
=
∑
j(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t)
Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t
× PRCi,q−1,t
PRCi,q,t
, (A64)
where the last term, PRCi,q−1,t/PRCi,q,t, is equal to the inverse of the stock’s realized gross return, so that
there is a “mechanical” relation between the return and HMFFSi,q,t.65
This concern can be addressed by computing the dollar volume of trading using the price at the beginning
of the quarter, i.e., VOL∗i,q,t = Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t × PRCi,q−1,t, and defining
HMFFS∗i,q,t ≡
∑
j(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t)
VOL∗i,q,t
=
∑
j(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t)
Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t
,
(A65)
so that the term PRCi,q−1,t/PRCi,q,t is no longer present. Panels A.1 and B.1 of Table A.7 show that our
results are robust to using HMFFS∗i,q,t instead of HMFFSi,q,t in the IV analysis.66
Wardlaw (2018) also argues that the total number of shares traded during the quarter could be correlated
with the return, so that scaling by Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t may be problematic, too. To address
this concern, we define two alternative measures that do not include Total Number of Shares Tradedi,q,t:
HMFFS∗∗i,q,t ≡
∑
j
(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t) (A66)
HMFFS∗∗∗i,q,t ≡
∑
j
(FLOWj,q,t × SHARESj,i,q−1,t × PRCi,q−1,t). (A67)
Panels A.2, B.2, A.3, and B.3 of Table A.7 show that our results are also robust to using ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗i,q,t)
and ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗∗i,q,t) instead of HMFFSi,q,t in the IV analysis.
65Using VOLi,q,t =
∑
m Shares Tradedi,m,q,t×PRCi,m,q,t as we do complicates the exposition without changing the intuition.
66It is also worth noting that the correlation between the original measure HMFFSi,q,t and the new measure HMFFS∗i,q,t is 0.975.
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Table A.7: Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS) IV Estimation using HMFFS∗, ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗), and ln(HMFFS∗∗∗) instead of HMFFS
This table presents 2SLS estimates of the sensitivity of Bidder CAR to Target Asset Beta. For Panels A.1 and B.1, we use HMFFS∗ instead of HMFFS to construct Target Noise Beta
and Bidder Noise Beta. For Panels A.2 and B.2, we use ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗). For Panels A.3 and B.3, we use ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗∗). The sample period is 1980 to 2015. Only bids for
private targets are included. Deal Controls is a vector comprising all deal-level controls included in columns (2) to (4) of Table 2: Deal Value (Log), Equity, Cash, Toehold, Hostile,
Same Industry, Crossborder, Poison, Tender, Multiple Bidders, Relative Size, and Bidder Size (Log). All other variables are defined as in Table 2. t-statistics based on standard errors
clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
Panel A.1 – 1st Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5.a) (5.b)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Target Target Target Target Target Beta
Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Spread
Target Noise Beta 3.77*** 3.73*** 2.34*** 2.36*** 2.34*** 2.40***
Constructed Using HMFFS∗ (9.34) (9.46) (11.92) (11.67) (10.89) (9.75)
Bidder Noise Beta 0.06 -2.56***
Constructed Using HMFFS∗ (0.30) (-8.84)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,334 13,048 12,939 11,707 11,706 11,706
Panel B.1 – 2nd Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta (Instrumented) 2.29* 2.58*** 3.99** 3.72** 5.15*
(1.92) (2.31) (2.15) (1.93) (1.91)
Beta Spread (Instrumented) -2.07
(-0.95)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,334 13,048 12,939 11,707 11,706
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Panel A.2 – 1st Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5.a) (5.b)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Target Target Target Target Target Beta
Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Spread
Target Noise Beta 3.23*** 3.21*** 1.97*** 1.99*** 1.98*** 2.00***
Constructed Using ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗) (10.63) (10.78) (11.61) (11.76) (10.62) (9.39)
Bidder Noise Beta 0.05 -2.20***
Constructed Using ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗) (0.28) (-9.04)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,358 13,051 12,942 11,708 11,707 11,707
Panel B.2 – 2nd Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta (Instrumented) 3.69** 3.75*** 5.95** 5.67** 6.49**
(2.67) (2.76) (2.44) (2.25) (2.01)
Beta Spread (Instrumented) -1.22
(-0.51)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,358 13,051 12,942 11,708 11,707
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Panel A.3 – 1st Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5.a) (5.b)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Target Target Target Target Target Beta
Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Asset Beta Spread
Target Noise Beta 3.23*** 3.21*** 2.04*** 2.07*** 2.06*** 2.08***
Constructed Using ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗∗) (12.33) (12.53) (12.85) (13.12) (11.66) (10.42)
Bidder Noise Beta 0.05 -2.26***
Constructed Using ln(1 + HMFFS∗∗∗) (0.28) (-10.06)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,353 13,052 12,943 11,715 11,714 11,714
Panel B.3 – 2nd Stage of 2SLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Private Targets
Dependent Variable: Bidder CAR (in Percentage Points)
Target Asset Beta (Instrumented) 2.70** 2.90*** 4.43** 4.58** 5.20*
(2.20) (2.38) (2.09) (2.06) (1.69)
Beta Spread (Instrumented) -0.93
(-0.42)
Bidder SDC Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deal Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Target Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,353 13,052 12,943 11,715 11,714
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Appendix VI – Reconciling Target Asset Beta and Avg. Discount Rate
To examine how well the cost of capital implied by Target Asset Beta lines up with Avg. Discount Rate (the
midpoint between the maximum and minimum rate in fairness opinions), we estimate the OLS regression
Avg. Discount Rate = α+ β × Predicted WACC + ε, (A68)
where Predicted WACC is the cost of capital implied by Target Asset Beta and the same assumptions as in
the model calibration in Section 4.3. Specifically, we estimate regression (A68) for various sub-samples
based on the spread between the maximum and minimum rate used in the fairness opinions, defined as
∆ ≡ rmax − rmin
Avg. Discount Rate
. (A69)
The reason for this approach is as follows. Avg. Discount Rate is not the actual discount rate used by the
bidder (which is unobserved) but only a proxy thereof. However, assuming that the discount rate used by the
bidder lies between the maximum and minimum discount rate used in the fairness opinion, Avg. Discount
Rate should be a more accurate proxy if the spread between the maximum and minimum rate is small.
Table A.8 displays the results of this analysis. In column (1), we include all fairness opinions. In
columns (2) to (11) we impose increasingly tight restrictions on the spread ∆ between the maximum and
minimum discount rate. For example, in column (6), we only use cases were ∆ < 0.2. In column (11), we
only use cases were ∆ < 0.1. We find that the coefficient estimate (β̂) on Predicted WACC approaches one
as the spread between the maximum and minimum discount rate in the fairness opinion decreases. Similarly,
the estimated regression constant (α̂) approaches zero. Indeed, in columns (7) to (11), one cannot reject the
hypotheses that the coefficient on Predicted WACC is equal to one and that the regression constant is zero.
That is, as the range of discount rates used in the fairness opinion becomes increasingly tight – so that the
variable Avg. Discount Rate becomes more likely to be an accurate estimate of the discount rate that was
actually used by the bidder – one cannot reject the hypothesis that the discount rate implied by Target Asset
Beta is equal to Avg. Discount Rate.
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Table A.8: Relation Between the Predicted WACC and the Midpoint Between the Maximum and Minimum Discount Rate Used in Fairness Opinions
This table presents results from the OLS regression Avg. Discount Rate = α + β × Predicted WACC + ε, where Avg. Discount Rate = (rmax + rmin) /2 and rmax and rmin are
the maximum and minimum discount rate used for DCF valuations provided in fairness opinions on takeover bids. Predicted WACC is the weighted average cost of capital for the
target that is implied by Target Asset Beta and the same assumptions that we make for the model calibration in Section 4.3. ∆ is the difference between rmax and rmin scaled by the
midpoint between rmax and rmin. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the target’s (SIC3-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Sample: Fairness Opinions on Bids for Private and Public Targets
Dependent Variable: Midpoint Between Maximum and Minimum Discount Rate Used in Fairness Opinion DCF (in Percentage Points)
Restriction: None ∆ < 11 ∆ <
1
2 ∆ <
1
3 ∆ <
1
4 ∆ <
1
5 ∆ <
1
6 ∆ <
1
7 ∆ <
1
8 ∆ <
1
9 ∆ <
1
10
Predicted WACC 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.76*** 1.04*** 1.08*** 0.98*** 1.01***
(4.20) (4.44) (4.32) (5.42) (5.65) (4.92) (5.38) (6.24) (5.00) (3.95) (4.70)
Constant 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
(5.06) (4.77) (4.93) (5.33) (3.94) (4.02) (3.41) (1.29) (0.88) (1.27) (1.39)
Observations 1,174 1,162 1,121 1,022 768 607 426 266 207 161 112
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Appendix VII – Share Repurchases and Seasoned Equity Offerings
Our results on the relation between bidders’ asset betas and the method of payment extend beyond takeover
bids. We have shown that high beta bidders are more likely to use equity to pay for the target, but if our
framework is correct, then the propensity to issue equity should be higher for high beta firms whether they
make acquisitions or not. To a CAPM-using manager of a high beta firm, raising funds by issuing equity
at the market price looks like a positive-NPV transaction – irrespective of the planned use of these funds
(M&A, capital expenditures, other investments, capital structure changes, or even payouts). Repurchasing
shares at the market price, on the other hand, looks like a negative-NPV investment.
Thus, we now move away from the setting of takeover bids and examine the relation between firms’
asset betas and their propensity to repurchase shares or conduct seasoned equity offerings. The intuition is
as follows. Firms that believe to be overvalued by the market are more likely to issue equity and less likely
to repurchase shares (Baker and Wurgler, 2013). Indeed, two-thirds of CFOs state that “the amount by
which our stock is undervalued or overvalued by the market” is an important or very important determinant
of the decision to issue equity (Graham and Harvey, 2001, p. 2016). More than 85% of financial executives
state that the “market price of our stock (if our stock is a good investment, relative to its true value)” is an
important or very important determinant of the decision to repurchase shares (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and
Michaely, 2005, p. 496). Hence, we predict a negative relation between a firm’s asset beta and Repurchase
– an indicator equal to one if a firm repurchases shares – and a positive relation between a firm’s asset beta
and SEO – an indicator equal to one if a firm conducts a seasoned equity offering.
To test this prediction we estimate the following OLS regression for all public firms in Compustat:67
Repurchaset (SEOt) = α+β×Asset Betat−1+γ′Firm Characteristicst−1+Industry × Year FE+ε. (A70)
Firm Characteristics is a vector of control variables commonly used in the literature on firms’ share repur-
67The sample period is 1977 to 2015.
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chase or equity issuance decisions (e.g., Dittmar, 2000; Alti and Sulaeman, 2012; Baker and Xuan, 2016):
the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization, the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and the ratios of
cash holdings, debt, and cash flows to assets. The standard errors are clustered by industry. Table A.9
presents the results. As predicted, we find a negative and highly significant relation between Asset Beta and
Repurchase and a positive and highly significant relation between Asset Beta and SEO. Table A.10 shows
that the results are similar when we use firms’ equity betas instead of their asset betas.
Table A.9: Share Repurchases and Seasoned Equity Offerings
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to repurchase shares (Repurchase) and to conduct seasoned
equity offerings (SEO) to the firm’s asset beta (Asset Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. All public firms in Compustat
are included. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the firm’s (SIC2-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: Repurchase SEO
Asset Beta -10.95*** -11.01*** 18.33*** 17.07***
(-5.45) (-6.49) (10.68) (10.56)
Market Capitalization (Log) 4.86*** 4.91***
(21.74) (18.33)
Market-to-Book -0.42*** 0.38***
(-6.79) (3.81)
Cash to Assets -2.72 1.43
(-0.79) (0.53)
Debt to Assets -10.77*** -3.37
(-5.30) (-1.09)
ROA 2.60 9.25**
(0.77) (2.46)
Cash Flow to Assets 4.12 -13.70***
(1.19) (-3.24)
SIC2 Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 319,143 219,486 318,771 219,162
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Table A.10: Share Repurchases, Seasoned Equity Offerings, and Equity Beta
This table presents OLS estimates of the sensitivity of the propensity to repurchase shares (Repurchase) and to conduct seasoned
equity offerings (SEO) to the firm’s equity beta (Equity Beta). The sample period is 1977 to 2015. All public firms in Compustat
are included. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by the firm’s (SIC2-) industry are reported in parentheses. Statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Public Firms in Compustat
Dependent Variable: Repurchaset SEOt
Equity Betat−1 -6.60** -9.73*** 15.50*** 11.18***
(-2.29) (-6.08) (5.07) (6.41)
Market Capitalizationt−1 (Log) 4.85*** 4.92***
(21.53) (18.35)
Market-to-Bookt−1 -0.44*** 0.40***
(-7.09) (3.89)
Cash to Assetst−1 -3.10 2.50
(-0.90) (0.92)
Debt to Assetst−1 -9.94*** -4.68
(-5.04) (-1.48)
ROAt−1 2.81 8.51**
(0.82) (2.18)
Cash Flow to Assetst−1 3.90 -12.97***
(1.11) (-2.96)
SIC2 Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333,001 219,584 332,629 219,260
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